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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court first clarified the law on
sexual harassment in the workplace.! Prior to the Meritor decision,
victims of hostile environment sexual harassment in the workplace,
as opposed to quid pro quo sexual harassment,2 were often subject
to unclear guidelines on whether they had a cause of action under
Title VIL5 After Meritor,clear guidelines established by the Court and
J.D. candidate, Washington College of Law at American University, 1998; B.A., cum laude Boston University, 1995. I would like to thank Professor Mark Hager for his comments. I would
also like to thank my parents, Camille and Mary, and all of my family for their love and support.
After this Casenote was written, but prior to publication, the Department of Education established guidelines supporting many of the views and proposals set forth in this paper. See 62 Fed.
Reg. 12,034 (1997). The guidelines were released on March 13, 1997.
1. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (holding that the correct inquiry in sexual harassment claims is whether sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether an
employee's participation in them was voluntary). Meritoralso held that an employee does not
have to suffer an economic detriment in order to state a valid sexual harassment claim, and that
mere existence of an employer's grievance procedure where the employer fails to invoke that
procedure does not necessarily insulate an employer from liability. Id. at 64-65, 72.
2. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when requests for sexual favors or submission
to sexual advances are an implicit or explicit condition of one's employment, or submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis of employment decisions affecting such individuals. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995). Hostile environment sexual harassment
occurs when the conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. Additionally, U.S. courts recognize a third type of sexual harassment, which is retaliation
against an employee for making a complaint or expressing opposition to harassment. Henry
Blackiston, When the Line ls Crossed: CompaniesShould Be Tougher On Sexual Harassmen FIN. TIMES,

July 23, 1996, at 14. This type of sexual harassment is beyond the scope of this Casenote.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) [hereinafter
"Tide VII"] (stating that Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sex).
Title VII states that no employer shall "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
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by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 4 required many

employers to take the problem of sexual harassment seriously, and to
develop sexual harassment policies and training programs to help
supervisors and co-workers know what behavior is and is not acceptable. While Meritorinvolved harassment of an employee by a supervisor, the Meritor Court relied on several circuit cases that had extended employer liability under Title VII for hostile environment
sexual harassment created by the victim's co-workers.6 Under Title
VII, an employer is liable for the harassment of an employee by another co-worker if the employer "knew or should have known" of the
harassment.7
The time has come for similar, clear guidelines on the issue of
peer sexual harassment in a school setting. There is a split in the
circuits on whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19728
supports a cause of action for a student who has been sexually harassed by another student. This Casenote will examine two recent,
conflicting cases dealing with peer sexual harassment claims: Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,9 and Davis v. Monroe County
Board ofEducation.'° Rowinsky denied the plaintiff a cause of action by
otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's ...
sex." Id.

4. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is the administrative
agency that enforces Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
5. See29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1995) (encouraging employers to prevent sexual harassment
by developing programs to inform employees about sexual harassment and Tide VII).
6. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902-04
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding employer liable for sexual harassment of one employee by another);
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the employer should have
known of the harassment problem because of its pervasive character and complaints by the employee to her supervisors); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(holding the employer liable for not taking remedial steps to halt known harassment); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding the employer liable for harassment by supervisory personnel)). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995) (stating that an employer is responsible
for sexual harassment where the employer knew or should have known of the condition, unless
the employer took immediate and appropriate action).
7. While Meitordidnot issue a definitive rule on co-worker harassment, Title VII does not
automatically confer employer liability for harassment between co-workers. See Meritor,477 U.S.
at 72. The Court instead followed the EEOC guidelines which say that Congress wanted courts
to look to agency law on this issue. Id. The EEOC guidelines make an employer liable for acts
of sexual harassment between co-workers "where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-86 (1994) [hereinafter "Tifle IX"].
9. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 165 (1996).
10. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.), vacated and reh'gen banc granted,91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).

Although it has been vacated, the Davisdecision has been cited with approval by several district
court cases dealing with peer sexual harassment. See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch.
Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 170, 172-75 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp.
1415, 1420-22 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193,
1204-07 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1996).
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failing to apply Title VII standards of hostile environment sexual
harassment in the workplace to a Title IX claim of hostile environment sexual harassment in a school setting. Davis, however, found a
cause of action for the plaintiff, and then went on to apply Title VII
standards to find for the plaintiff. This Casenote will argue that the
application of Title VII standards to a Title IX peer sexual harassment claim, where the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, would have resolved the concerns which led the Rowinsky court
to deny the plaintiff a cause of action. This Casenote further advocates a test similar to the one used in Davis."
In addition, this Casenote will argue that the Supreme Court in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools 2 intended for schools to
prevent a sexually hostile education environment, and that Franklin
put schools on notice that failure to do so could make the school liable for damages to a victim of peer sexual harassment. While Franklin involved a teacher who sexually harassed a student and Rowinsky
involves student-student sexual harassment, this Casenote argues
that Franklinis relevant and that the Rowinsky court erred in its reasoning when it denied the plaintiff an application of Title VII standards, and that had it applied Title VII standards, the plaintiff would
have had a valid cause of action.
A clear guideline must emerge because the problem of sexual harassment among peers is occurring at increasing numbers in high
schools and middle schools across the country.1 s Vulgarities and
physical intimidation such as those endured by the plaintiffs in Rowinsky and DaviSO4 are all too familiar for young women seeking relief
11. See Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1193 (modifying only the last element of Davis'five-part test
which is the establishment of some basis for institutional liability). The Davisfive part test states
the elements necessary to make a Title IX claim against a school board for hostile environment
peer sexual harassment. The elements are (1) the plaintiff is of a protected group; (2) the
plaintiff has been subject to unvelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on
sex; (4) the harassment was severe and pervasive enough to alter the plaintiff's education and
to create an abusive educational environment; and (5) a basis for institutional liability exists.
Davis,74 F.3d at 1194.
12. 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding damages as a remedy available for the enforcement of Titie IX).
13. See Karen Schneider & John Woestendiek, Most Teens Say They're Sexually Harassed,
Schools Hit By Epidemic,' MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 1993, at Al; See Monica Sherer, Comment, No
LongerJust Child's Play:School Liabiliy Under Title 1Xfor PeerSexual Harassmen, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
2119, 2128 n.40 (1993) (citing MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF EDUC., WHO'S HURT AND WHO's LIABLE:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN MASSACH-uSEMrs SCHOOLS 2 (1986) [hereinafter WHO's HURT AND
WHO'S LIABLE] (Curriculum and Guide for School Personnel) (stating that peer sexual harassment is more common than teacher-student sexual harassment)).
14. The Rowinsky plaintiffs, two sisters in the eighth grade, were harassed by male students
who rode with them on the same school bus. The boys repeatedly felt underneath the girls'
clothing, groped their genital areas under their skirts, and asked, "When are you going to let
me fuck you?" Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008. The Davisplantiff was a thirteen-year-old girl who was
repeatedly fondled, molested, and verbally propositioned by another fifth-grade male student.
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from peer sexual harassment. 5 While there are cases of sexual harassment among peers at the university level, 16 this Casenote will focus
primarily on elementary, middle, and high schools. In cases where a
teacher sexually harasses a student, standards similar to Title VII
have been adopted in order to find a school liable under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 197217 for both quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment.18 Because this Casenote foDavis, 74 F.3d at 1188-89.
15. While this Casenote focuses on females because females are more likely to be victims of
sexual harassment, studies show that boys can be and are victims of sexual harassment as well.
See Sherer, supra note 13, at 2128 n.42 (noting a 1988 study that revealed that only one of 130
males responding said he had been a victim of sexual harassment compared to 33-60 percent of
the 133 females surveyed); see Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth R-Respect: CombatingPeerSexual Harassment ins the Public Schools, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 219 n.38 (1994) (citing American Association of University Women, "Hostile Hallways," 1993 study [hereinafter AAUW Survey] (noting
that 76 percent of boys experienced some type of sexual harassment at school, compared to 85
percent of girls); Mark Jennings & LaShawn Howell, BlackboardJungle '93: Coping With Groping
and Worse: Oh, Girls Aren't the Only Ones Getting Hassled,WASH. POST, Jul. 25, 1993, at C3. For an
example of potential sexual harassment of a male, see also Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111
(D. Utah 1994) (involving a boy whose football teammates taped him nude to a shower stall in a
locker room and then brought his girlfriend into the locker room to see him in such condition.
The court held that the boy did not have a claim under Title IX because the harassment was not
based on his gender, but rather on his physical stature; i.e., his small height and weight);
Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., No. UNN-L-6556-94, slip op. (NJ. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 1996) (holding
that a seventeen-year-old boy harassed at work by male co-workers and supervisors for being a
virgin, and subjected to other harassment based on gender stereotyping had a cause of action
under NewJersey's Law Against Discrimination). For purposes of this Casenote, the harasser
will be referred to as "he," and the victim will be referred to as "she."
16. While this Casenote focuses on lower education, Title IX also applies to colleges and
universities. See e.g., Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(holding that Title VII standards applied to a hostile environment claim under Title IX), affd
800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.
1988) (applying Tide VII standards to a peer harassment case in a medical school because
medical students are not only trained but also receive a salary, and therefore, should be viewed
as employees). For examples of incidents of peer sexual harassment at the early end of the age
spectrum, see Jack Tinker, Kissing a Charmless Goodbye To Sanity, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 28, 1996
(noting the widely-publicized story ofJonathan Prevette, a six-year-old North Carolina boy who
was put in detention after kissing a six-year-old classmate on the cheek. The girl had asked
Jonathan to kiss her.); SallyJesse Raphael: 'My Seven-Year Old Was Sexually Harassedat School'
(ABC television broadcast, Oct. 14, 1992); Ruth Shalit, RomperRoom: Sexual Harassment-By Tots,
NEW REPuBLIC, Mar. 29, 1993, at 13 (detailing the case of a 5-year-old who pulled down his
classmate's pants, "jumped on top of her," and "began simulating sexual intercourse"); Judy
Mann, Making Schools SafeForGirls, WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at E3 (explaining how peer sexual
harassment starts at a very early age) (quoting Bernice R. Sandier of the Center for Women
Policies Studies. Ms. Sandier initiated research on peer sexual harassment).
17. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1994).
18. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). The Court stated that
"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Id. (quoting Menitor,477 U.S. at 64). The court continued by saying that "the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a
student. Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe." Id. While the Supreme Court cited to Title
VII cases, it did not, however, squarely address the issue of whether Title VII standards and
remedies are applicable to Title IX because the plaintiff, Christine Franklin, did not pursue this
claim. Franklin,503 U.S. at 65. Ms. Franklin's fhilure to pursue this claim led the Rowinsky court
to label this section of the Franklindecision as dictum. Rouinsky, 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.),
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cuses on harassment by students, the term "peer sexual harassment"
in this Casenote refers to hostile environment sexual harassment
that is created by other students.
Part II of this Casenote discusses the facts of the Rowinsky decision,
the significance of the decision, and provides details on the problems of peer sexual harassment. This section also explains why a
clear answer is necessary to resolve the split in the circuits on
whether to apply Title VII standards to school liability for peer sexual
harassment claims under Title IX, and discusses whether a plaintiff
even has a cause of action under Title IX when the harassers are
peers and not the educational institution. Part III provides prior history and background, including the text and purposes of Title IX,
relevant case law dealing with Title IX in the context of peer sexual
harassment, and a definition of sexual harassment. Part IV analyzes
the Rowinsky court's reasoning and explains why Franklin does not
preclude the applicability of Title VII standards to peer sexual harassment claims. Part V explains the procedural steps a victim of sexual harassment must take to file a claim under Title IX, and briefly
discusses other avenues of relief and other remedies available. Part
VI provides recommendations, and proposes a modified Davis-type
approach. Part VII concludes with the opinion that allowing a Title
IX cause of action for peer sexual harassment will provide plaintiffs
with a remedy, which comports with the Supreme Court's concerns
in Franklin,and will provide incentives for schools to directly address
and prevent peer sexual harassment.
II. THE FACTS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RowiNSIY

A. The Facts ofRowinsky
1. Months ofHarassmentandPhysicalAssault
Jane andJanet Doe were enrolled in the eighth grade in the Bryan
Independent School District (BISD) during the 1992-1993 school
year. 9 They rode a bus to and from school each day, and school policy required that boys and girls sit on opposite sides of the bus.20 The
bus driver, James Owens, enforced the restriction at first.2 ' Starting
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
19. Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996). For their protection and privacy, the court did not use the girls' real names. To
protect the identity of the male students as well, the court used only their initials.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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in September 1992, "G.S.", a male student, began regularly to harass
Janet.2 Such harassment continued throughout the school year. On
the first incident, and during each subsequent incident, G.S. swatted
Janet's buttocks whenever she walked down the aisle, and made such
comments as, "When are you going to let me fuck you?"; "What bra
size are you wearing?" and "What size panties are you wearing?"23 He
also called her a "whore," and once groped her genital area. 24 The
first time the harassment occurred, Janet reported it to Owens no
less than eight times during the bus ride home.2 Owens took names
down on paper, but did nothing else. 26 These incidents occurred
daily on the bus. Eventually, Janet stopped reporting them, even
though the harassment continued through May.
After the first incident, the seriousness of the harassment increased. G.S. continued to grope Janet's breasts and genital areas on
the bus, and began to harass Jane in the same manner as well. 2' A
visit to the school's principal by Mr. and Mrs. Rowinsky shortly after
the first incident resulted in G.S.' suspension from riding the bus for
three days.2 Once he was allowed to ride the bus again, G.S. was undeterred, and continued to harass the girls, even after Owens made
Janet and Jane sit at the front the bus. 0 Despite the seating change,
G.S., as well as other boys continued to harass the girls.' A boy
named "L.H." reached up Janet's skirt, made a crude remark, and
grabbed her genital area.3 2 Janet complained to Owens at the next
stop light, but he "juststared into space." s L.H. then did the same
to Jane a few days later, but she did not report that incident to
Owens.3

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.), crt. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1008-09.
27. Id. at 1008.

28. Id.
29.
Ct. 165
30.
31.

Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
(1996).
Id.
Id. at 1009.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996).
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2. Response of the Bryan IndependentSchool District
By March, the harassment had spread to the classroom as well as
the school bus. During class, another male student, "F.F.," reached
underJanet's shirt and unfastened her bra? The school principal
suspended F.F. for the incident, and told Mrs. Rowinsky that suspensions from the bus and from class were appropriate punishments because the principal did not consider F.F.'s conduct to be sexual. 6
Throughout the school year, Mrs. Rowinsky's consistent complaints and almost weekly phone calls and visits resulted in little
change or investigation into the matter. A disciplinary report on file
with the principal incorrectly listed one of the dates, contained other
inaccuracies, and did not include G.S.' name. 7 Mrs. Rowinsky
pointed this out, and Principal Caperton corrected the report.8 In
December, she also contacted Jay Anding, Assistant Director of
Transportation, who said he would investigate the matter.3 9 Almost
one month later, she called to check on the progress of the investigation. Anding informed her that he did not conduct an investigation,
but instead suspended L.H. for three days. ° Mrs. Rowinsky then
complained to Dr. Tom Purify, the BISD Director of Secondary Education, who referred her to Anding's assistant, C.W. Henry.4 Henry
reviewed the videotapes from the bus, and assigned a new driver to
replace Owens.? The new driver, however, assigned Jane the seat
next to G.S.? Mrs. Rowinsky then removed her daughters from the
bus, and although there were no new assaults by G.S., asked that G.S.
be removed from the bus as well.? While Purifoy said that G.S's
conduct merited expulsion, Purifoy refused to take further action
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1008.
38. Id.
39. Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (5th Cir.), cei. denied, 117 S.
Ct 165 (1996).
40. Id. at 1009.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The appellate court decision did not explain why the new bus driver did not adhere
to the school's policy of separating boys and girls. This is one of many facts that the appellate
court should have considered to see whether or not the plaintiff had a cause of action, because
these facts may have indicated that the school did intentionally violate Tite IX by not responding to the girls' claims with seriousness. See id. at 1016-17 (Dennis, J., dissenting opinion)
(stating that these facts demonstrate that the school board knowingly failed to take appropriate
measures to protect Jane and Janet from "harassment, abuse, and discrimination by male stu-

dents that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile and abusive educational environment for the plaintiffs").
44. Id. at 1009.
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against G.S. without proof of the assaults from juvenile records.4
Even after the bra-unfastening incident, mentioned above, the
school never informed Mrs. Rowinsky of the existence of Title IX or
of Title IX grievance procedures,46 as required by Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") guidelines.4' When questioned about this by Mrs. Rowinsky and her attorney, Vice-Principal
Sandra Petty replied that the bra incident was not "sexual,"4" and
Sarah Ashburn, the BISD superintendent, said that the incidents on
the bus were not "assaults."4
Mrs. Rowinsky then filed a claim under Title IX through OCR."
She brought a suit on behalf of her minor daughters that the school
condoned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment, both
at school and on the bus
Specifically, she alleged that Janet was
sexually harassed at school, and thatJane, Janet, and other girls were
sexually harassed by male students while riding the BISD school
bus. 2 She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages and attorney's fees.!'
B. The Basic Holdingof Rowinsky and Why It Is Important
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and held
that Mrs. Rowinsky failed to state a valid Title IX claim because she
did not allege that the BISD discriminated against students on the
45. Id. The Rowinskys filed sexual assault charges against G.S. with the Bryan city police.
Id. at 1008 n.2. G.S. was later convicted of this charge. Dawn E. Connor, School Isn't Liable For
HarassmentBy Student, LAW. WKLYUSA, Apr. 22, 1996, at 1, 19.
46. Rowdnsky, 80 F.d at 1009.
47. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (1996). This section requires all schools which receive federal assistance to designate at least one employee to be responsible for working with OCR on any relevant claims. The school must also "notify all its students and employees of the name, office address and telephone number of the employee or employees appointed" to this capacity. Id.
48. Rominsky, 80 F.3d at 1009.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1009-10.
52. Id. at 1010.
53. Rowinsky v.Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.), cet. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996). This Casenote will not deal with the issue of damages. In Franklin, the Supreme
Court said that the plaintiff had a cause of action, which was resolved by Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (cited in Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65). The Franklin Court then held
that the plaintiff had a right to the damages sought because the school's relief was inadequate.
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75-76. The court emphasized that a cause of action is a wholly different
issue from whether one can recover damages. Id. at 65-67. Because the law is unclear on
whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action for student-student peer sexual harassment, and
a right of action must exist before one can recover damages, the question of damages will not be
addressed in this Casenote.
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basis of sex." In other words, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence
that the school treated sexual harassment and misconduct towards
female students less seriously than it treated such behavior towards
its male students.0 The district court relied on the following facts:
(1) boys who assaulted girls were punished in the same manner as
boys who assaulted boys. Any disparity in punishment was due to the
different levels of physical conduct involved in each incident, and
not because of differences in sex;6 and (2) that any failure to train
employees would harm male and female victims of harassment
equally. 7 Mrs. Rowinsky appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's holding.
Rowinsky is important because it is the most recent of several cases
that deal with the imposition of liability under Title IX of a school
for failing to protect its students from sexual harassment by other
students. The relevant part of Title IX provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ....
Rowinsky interpreted "discrimination under" narrowly and held
that the school is not liable for failing to stop sexual harassment by
another student unless the victim alleges that the school responded
to her claim less seriously than it would have responded to a claim by
a male who was being bullied by another male, or a male who was being harassed by a female student. 9 Absent such an allegation, the
court held, there is no "discrimination" on the basis of sex as intended by Title X.69
C. The Facts ofDavis and a Brief Comparisonof Its Holding
Less than two months after the Rowinsky case was argued,61 the
54. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The contention that males and females are equally harmed by sexual harassment is
inaccurate. See Dolan, supra note 15, at 225 n.103 (citing AAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 15-

17). See also infra notes 104-12. Further, sexual harassment damages young girls more than

older women. Deborah R. Baurac, Sxual Harassment a Painful Lesson For Teenagers, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 8, 1992, § 6, at 1 (quoting University of Iowa psychologist Amy Reynolds, that damage is

more severe for adolescent girls because they may become women who are "estranged from
their own bodies").
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
59. Rodnsky, 80 F.3d at 1006, 1015-16.

60. Id.
61. Because the Davis decision was decided two months after Rowinsky was argued, and
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Eleventh Circuit accepted a broader definition of "discrimination
under" and held in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educatio6 2 that a
school is liable for damages under Title IX where harassment by another student created a sexually hostile education environment, and
the supervising authorities knowingly failed to act to eliminate the
harassment.6
1. Months ofAbuse andAssaults
Between December 1992 and May 1993, LaShonda Davis was a
fifth-grader in Monroe County.6 During this six-month period,
"G.F.," also a fifth-grader, sexually harassed and/or abused
LaShonda by attempting to fondle her, fondling her, and directing
sexual and abusive language towards her such as, "I want to get in
bed with you," and "I want to feel your boobs."5 These comments
often accompanied the physical abuse mentioned above.6 The incidents became more serious. Once, G.F., placing a door stop in his
pants, began to behave in a sexually suggestive manner towards
LaShonda. A few months later, he rubbed against her in a sexually
67
suggestive
manner.
continued
until he
was charged
with and The
pled incidents
guilty to sexual
batterytoinescalate
May 1993.6
2. The Response of the Monroe County School District
LaShonda complained to her mother after all but one incident,
and they both made repeated trips to the principal's office, which resulted in no improvement or progress in the situation.6 9 After one
incident in class, LaShonda's teacher denied her request to report
Rowinsky had not been decided yet, the Davis decision is not used by the Rowinsky plaintiff, and
the Rowiunsky court only refers to it in a footnote, saying that Davis in no way alters its analysis.
Roudnsky, 80 F.3d at 1010 n.8.
62. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.) (applying Title VII hostile environment standards to hold the
school liable), vacated and rehkgen bancgranted,91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 1192. The Davis court relied on a Letter of Findings written by OCR. OCR has
jurisdiction over Title IX claims. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1996). The Letter, using Tite VII stan-

dards, indicated that a school fails to satisfy Title IX if it &Mils
to "respond adequately to actual or
constructive notice of the harassment." Davis, 74 F.Sd 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting
John E. Palomino, Letter of Findings, OCR Docket No. 09-92-6002, at 2 (July 24, 1992)). This

Casenote advocates that a school should be liable only for failing to respond adequately to harassment of which it had actual knowledge.
64. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1188 (11th Cir.), vacated and rehg
en bancgrante 91 F.Sd 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
65. Id. at 1188-89.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1189.
68. Id.
69. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir.), vacated and rehg
en bangranted 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
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G.F. to the principal. 70 When Mrs. Davis again tried to obtain protection for her daughter, the principal asked LaShonda "why she
[LaShonda] was the only one complaining."7' LaShonda and Mrs.
Davis also asked if LaShonda's assigned seat, which was next to G.F.,
could be moved.n This request was denied until after LaShonda
complained for over three months.73 School officials never removed
or disciplined G.F. in any manner for his harassment of LaShonda.74
Mrs. Davis also alleged that the months of abuse had a detrimental
effect on LaShonda's ability to benefit from her elementary education, decreasing her concentration on her school work, and causing
her grades, which had been all A's and B's, to fall.75 The harassment
also seriously affected LaShonda's mental and emotional health,
leading her to write a suicide note in April 1993.76
3. The Holdingof Davis
The court applied Tide VII standards and held that the school was
liable because, by failing to protect LaShonda, it denied her the
benefits of and subjected her to discrimination under the Monroe
77
County education system on the basis of her sex.
The court first decided that Tide IX encompassed a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment because Tide VII recognizes that
co-workers as well as supervisors can create a hostile sexual environment.n Relying on Senator Bayh's statements regarding the purpose
of Tide IX, which was to eliminate sexual discrimination in education, and the Supreme Court's granting of a right of action for intentional violations of Tide IX in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools," the court felt that Title VII provided appropriate guidelines
for determining whether a school is liable for claims of harassment
of one student by other students."0 The court also relied on Lipsett v.

University of Puerto Rico,' which held that Tide VII applied to the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir.), vacated and rehk
en bancgrantei 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 1193-94.

78. Id.
79. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
80. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190-91.
81. 864 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1988). Lipsel involved a female medical student in the residency
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"mixed employment-training context."2 The Lipsett court said that
Title IX's legislative history "strongly suggests that Congress meant
for similar substantive standards to apply under Title IX as had been
developed under Title VII."s The Davis court reasoned that if Title
VII standards are applicable to the mixed employment-training context and to harassment caused by other third parties," Title VII standards should be applicable to peer harassment in the educational
setting as well.as In addition, the court relied on a Letter of Findings
by the Office of Civil Rights that stated "[i]f the harassment is carried
out by non-agent students, the institution may nevertheless be found
in noncompliance with Title IX if it failed to respond adequately to
actual or constructive notice of the harassment."86 The Davis court
accorded the OCR Letters of Findings great deference because OCR
is the agency charged with the administration of Title IX,87 something the Rowinsky court did not do.8a
After deciding that Title IX applies to peer sexual harassment
program whose supervisors and coworkers subjected her to an atmosphere of sexual harassment
at the hospital. But see Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006 (noting that Lipsett is not entirely opposite because medical students in a residency program are also employees, thus making Title VII standards more applicable).
82. Davis 74 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Lipset4 864 F.2d at 897).
83. Id.
84. The court also cited to Murray v. New York University College ofDentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d

Cir. 1995). In Murray, the plaintiff was a dental student who was subjected to a hostile working
and learning environment created by a patient. The Second Circuit found that if a school has
notice of the harassment, "the educational institution may be held liable under standards similar to those applied in cases under Title VII. Murray, 57 F.3d at 249. In Murray, however, the
plaintiff lost her claim because she failed to show that the college had notice of the hostile environment. Murray, 57 F.3d at 249-51.
85. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1192.
86. Da*s, 74 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Letter of Findings byJohn E. Palomino, Regional Civil
Rights Director, Region IV (July 24, 1992), Docket No. 09-92-6002, at 2).
87. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195 n.4 (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522
n.12 (1982)). See also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(noting that OCR Letters of Findings are entitled to some deference "as they express the opinion of an agency charged with implementing Title IX and its regulations.").
88. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cr. 1996). The Rowinsky court stated that Letters of
Finding by OCR do not constitute an agency "interpretation" because they are written in reference to a specific incident or claim in order to force an institution to voluntarily comply with
Title IX. Id. at 1015. Examples of agency interpretations that would meet the qualifications to
be accorded great weight would be OCR's Policy Memorandum and OCR's implementation
regulation at 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1995) because these represent "deliberate policy statements and
[are] consistent with past agency interpretations." Id. (quoting 59 [sic] C.F.R. § 106 (1995)).
The Romnsky court noted that the policy memorandum left the issue of peer sexual harassment
unresolved. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015, 1015 n.22 (citing OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of Litigation, Enforcement, and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights
Directors (Aug. 31, 1981)). But see Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students By
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed Reg. 12,034, 12,036 (1997)
[hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance) (explaining that Rowinsky misconstrued OCR's
long-standing interpretation of Title IX). This Casenote will not squarely address the issue of
what is the proper weight attributable to an administrative agency interpretation.
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claims, the court held that when a school board "knowingly fails to
take action to remedy a hostile environment caused by a student's
sexual harassment of another, the harassed student has 'be[en] denied the benefits of, or be[en] subjected to discrimination under'
that educational program in violation of Title IX[.] "s9
After considering this, the Davis court then went on to consider
the validity of the plaintiff's allegations using the theory applied in
Meritor 0 The court used a Title VII approach and analogized the
harassment LaShonda endured and her complaints to the school
board to a workplace scenario."' The Title VII approach requires
that an employer take steps to assure that the working environment
is free from sexual harassment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to alter the condition of the victim's employment and create
an abusive working environment."92 The court applied LaShonda's
situation to the factors focused on by the Meitor Court,93 and found
that she established a prima facie claim under Title IX for sexual discrimination due to the school board's failure to remedy a sexually
hostile environment despite knowledge of the harassment. 94
Very few cases have directly addressed the issue of peer sexual harassment, 5 but these cases are becoming more frequent as the numbers and seriousness of peer sexual harassment incidents continue to
increase. 5
89. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)).
90. Id. (citing Mentor,477 U.S. at 66-73).
91. Davis; 74 F.3d at 1194-95.
92. I& at 1189-90 (quoting Merito, 477 U.S. at 67 (1986)). The harasser's intent to make
the victim feel uncomfortable is irrelevant. See Stephen Henderson, Sexual Harassmen4 CHI.
TRi., May 23, 1996, at 1 (noting that a harasser who emphasizes that his behavior was accidental, unintentional or ajoke may still be liable for creating a hostile environment if a reasonable
person would perceive the behavior as sexual harassment).
93. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Regarding the fifth
element, the court applied Title VII standards and case law, which holds an employer liable if it
"knew or should have known of the harassment, to determine if a school should be liable when
it has actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment." Id. (citing Met/tor, 477 U.S. at 66-73;
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 90305 (11th Cir. 1982)). This Casenote proposes that the school be held liable when it has actual
knowledge of the harassment and fails to take prompt and appropriate remedial action. See in-

fra Part VI.
94. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195. Judge Birch, in his dissenting/concurring opinion, however,
found the application of Title IX to claims of sexual harassment by students "unprecedented"
and applied only by an overly broad reading of Title IX. Judge Birch also felt that the school
board did not intentionally discriminate against LaShonda on the basis of sex, and therefore,
intentional discrimination, as prohibited by Title IX, was not at issue. Rather, Judge Birch felt
that the issue was whether the school board was negligent, and that Tide IX should not cover
the negligent behavior of a school board as the majority infers from its broad reading of Title
IX. Davis,74 F.3d at 1195-96 (Birch,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
96. See Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Schools Grapple With Peer Harassment, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
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The issue in most peer sexual harassment cases is whether Title IX
makes a school liable for failing to stop hostile environment sexual
harassment of one student by another when the school has knowledge of the harassment. Several legal scholars have argued that Title
IX does impose such liability, and that the student should be allowed
to recover damages from the school, because the Supreme Court in
Franklinapproved the incorporation of Title VII standards for a student to recover damages under Title IX in teacher-student sexual
harassment cases. 7 One scholar argues for imposing school liability
for failure to prevent peer sexual harassment under the duty the-

ory." Another argument imposes Title VII standards when the
school has notice of the harassment.?

MoNrrOR, Jan. 21, 1993, at 3 (noting that Susan Strauss, a sexual harassment consultant in
Minnesota, believes that peer harassment is not a new phenomenon and that it is becoming
more prevalent).
97. SeegeneralyJillSuzanne Miller, Title Wand Title V. Happy Together as a Resolution to Title

IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699 (1995) (arguing that with a narrow
definition of sexual harassment, Title VI and Title VII standards should apply to peer sexual
harassment. Currently, liability is imposed only on educational institutions. The author proposes that liability should fall on the school official(s) who knew or should have known that one
student's questionable actions would have offended other students). Title VI, in language
identical to Title IX, prohibits race discrimination in any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994). This Casenote will not focus on Title VI, nor
on damages. See also Sherer, supra note 13 (proposing that peer sexual harassment creates a
hostile educational environment, that a school setting is comparable to a workplace environment, and that Title IX should be expanded to cover peer sexual harassment. The author proposes a five part test similar to that used by the Davis court.); ElizabethJ. Gant, Applying Title VII
'Hostile Work Environment"Analysis to Title JX ofthe EducationAmendments of 1972- An Avenue of ReliefFor Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 DIcK. L. REV. 489 (1994)

(arguing that sexual harassment in school among students is comparable to sexual harassment
in the workplace among co-workers, and that applying Title VII standards of liability to schools
will help eliminate the growing problem of peer sexual harassment).
98. See Dolan, supra note 15, at 215 (asserting that a special relationship exists between
school officials and school children, and thus, officials have an affirmative duty to protect students against peer sexual harassment). The author discusses the special relationship doctrine
of Deshaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Seruices, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and proposes a

"reasonable foreseeability" standard of review in determining school official liability to help prevent peer sexual harassment. Dolan, supranote 15, at 240. The author also argues that mandatory school attendance laws further support the notion that a duty exists. Dolan, supra note 15,
at 240.). See also Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding
that schools owe some duty of care to elementary school students who are legally required to
attend school, thus allowing a § 1983 claim to go forward). But see Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F.
Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995) (explicitly disagreeing with Paganoand holding that a teacher is entitled to qualified immunity in peer sexual harassment suits because Title IX imposes a duty on
schools (and teachers) to protect students from the harassment of other teachers, not from
other students, even where the teacher is a proper Title IX defendant). This Casenote does not
address the duty argument. Rather, it will focus on the Title VII argument, as well as arguments
used in Rowinsky and other peer sexual harassment cases, which are mainly based on Title IX's
language and history.
99. Dolan, supranote 15, at 240-44.

Spring 1997]

PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

467

D. The Problem of PeerSexual Harassmentand the Misunderstandings
Hinderinga Solution
The problem of peer sexual harassment is growing, pervasive, and
serious. A 1993 study by the American Association of University
Women ("AAUW") entitled "Hostile Hallways" surveyed 1,632 students, in grades eight through eleven in seventy-nine public
schools.0'a The study found that 85 percent of girls and 76 percent of
boys experienced some type of sexual harassment in the school environment, mostly by their peers.101 The study revealed that studentstudent sexual harassment is more common than student-teacher
harassment.' One-third of the girls and twelve percent of the boys
who were victims of sexual harassment reported not wanting to go to
school because of the harassment.103
Studies show that girls are more frequently the victims of peer
sexual harassment,' °4 and that it impacts girls much more harshly
than boys.lts Peer sexual harassment has negative effects on a girl's
self-esteem and productivity. °6 She may not want to go to class, or
will drop a class in order to avoid the harassers.'t 8 Some girls have
even quit school because of peer sexual harassment, thereby altering
the career paths they may have taken had the harassment been
stopped.'t°
Studies also show that boys do not realize the impact their actions
100. Dolan, supra note 15, at 219 n.37 (cingAAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 5).
101. Dolan, supra note 15, at 219 n.38 (citingAAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 7).
102. Of the students who reported sexual harassment, 18 percent claimed they were harassed by a school employee. The remainder were victims of sexual harassment by peers. Dolan,
supra note 15, at 219 n.39 (citing AAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 10).
103. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2134 n.78 (citing WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE, supra note
13, at 6). See infra notes 107-09, and accompanying text (discussing the effects of peer sexual
harassment on the educational choices of its victims).
104. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2128 n.42 (citing WHO'S HURT AND wHo's LIABLE, supra note
13, at 2).
105. Baurac, supra note 57, at 1.
106. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2132 n.64 (citing WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE, supra note
13, at 12).
107. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2153 n.189 (dtingWHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE, supra note
13, at 4).
108. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2153 n.189 (citingWHO'S HURTAND WHO'S LIABLE, supra note

13, at 4)).
109. Dolan, supra note 15, at 225 n.103 (citing AAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 15-16); Dolan, supra note 15, at 226 (explaining that sexual harassment often deters women from pursuing
fields in science and engineering, as well as non-traditional employment, such as auto-repair).
The Rowinsky sisters eventually left the school district and moved to another town. Bill Hewitt,
Jack Boulware, Anthony Duignan-Cabrera, Joseph Harmes & Carol Simons, Bitter Lessons; School
Days Aren't Golden Rule Days Anymore, And Some Parents Are Suing To Keep Their Kids From Being
Abused, PEOPLE, Oct. 28, 1996, at 52,54.
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have on their female classmates.!" Males find sex talk "titillating,"
while females find it intimidating, and it makes them feel vulnerable."' Males also misunderstand the seriousness of their actions. As
one male student put it: "It's a man thing. When a girl has on something revealing, you have to say something about it. If the girl
doesn't tell
us we're sexually harassing her, we're going to continue
2
to do it.""
The misunderstanding is notjust between the victims and the harassers. Victims do not always get the attention they deserve because
the problem of peer sexual harassment is frequently misunderstood
by school" 3 and court officials,"' the parents of the harassers,15 and
the media. One news writer listed the Davis decision in an article entitled "Stupid Court Tricks" because he claimed, incorrectly, that it
gave the mother of the victim a cause of action under Title IX although the mother had not been sexually abused."6 The article further said that the mother complained because a boy had 'pestered'
her daughter."7 The abuse suffered by Ms. Davis, a 10-year-old girl,
however, lasted over six months and led her to contemplate suicide
and write a suicide note. In another case, peer sexual harassment
led to one teen's suicide."18
Such misunderstandings are the result of people being unaware
110. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2132 n.65 (citing WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE, supra note
13, at 12).
111. Deborah Tannen & Peggy Brawley, ... And Why Don't Some Men Understand, PEOPLE,
OCL 28, 1991, at 48.
112. SUSAN STRAUSS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TEENS, A PROGRAM FOR POSITIVE CHANGE 17
(1992).
113. At least one school official brushed off a complaint by a female student with a simple
"boys will be boys" response. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting the statement of a counselor to a female student who complained that her peers
were making sexual comments to her and writing lewd things about her on bathroom walls),
reconsiderationgranted,949 F. Supp. 1415 (NJ). Cal. 1996).
114. The Rowinsy decision refused to acknowledge that a power relationship exists among
students, despite the fact that studies have proven that such a relationship does exist. Rowinshy,
80 F.3d at 1011 n.l. See infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
115. SeeJane Gross, Where 'Boys Will Be Boys, "And Adults Are Befuddled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1993, atAl (reporting on a group of approximately 25 California high school boys known as the
"Spur Posse" who were accused of systematically raping, molesting, and intimidating female students). Gross noted that some parents of the boys were "downright boastful of their sons." Id.
atAl3.
116. Seejohn Leo, Stupid Court Triks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1996, at 24. The
author apparently misunderstood that the plaintiff's mother brought the suit as next friend of
her minor daughter, LaShonda. Davi; 74 F.3d 1186, 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), vacated and rehk en
bancgranted,91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
117. Leo, supra note 116, at 24.
118. Doug Grow, Suicide Ended Kathi s Tight For Dignity,' MINNEAPOuS STAR TRIB., July 5,
1993, at C3.
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that this behavior is unacceptable. 19 The misunderstandings of the
severity of peer sexual harassment and its effects; the conflict among
the circuits on whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under Title
IX when the harassment is caused by peers; and the questions which
remained to be answered after Franklin2" illustrate the need for the
law to set clear, consistent guidelines to determine when a victim will
have a cause of action under Title IX, and whether Title VII standards should apply.

III. PRIOR HISTORYAND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Purposeof Title IX
In 1972, in response to increasing awareness of sex discrimination
in education,'21 Congress enacted Title IX to address two different
aspects of the concern. First, Congress did not want to distribute
federal funds to education institutions that practiced sex discrimination.'2 Second, Congress wanted to protect the victims of such discrimination. Senator Birch Bayh, the sponsor of Title IX, intended
is
for Title IX to be "a strong and comprehensive measure which ...
to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek
needed ...
He realized that
education and training for later careers ... ."'
"because education provides access to jobs and financial security,
discrimination here is doubly destructive for women."124 Title IX exists to prevent a person, on the basis of sex, from being "denied the
benefits of ...any academic, extracurricular, ... or other education
program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits
from Federal financial assistance. " '25 Scholars argue and studies and
Congressional findings show that peer sexual harassment prevents
victims from enjoying the full benefits of their education.2
119. SeeCATHARINEMACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OFWORKINGWOMEN 27 (1979); infra
note 136 and accompanying text.
120. See CharlesJ. Russo, Virginia Davis Nordin & Terrence Lead, SexualHarassment and Student Rights: The Supreme Court Expands Title IX Remedies, 75 EDUC. LAW REP. 733 (1992)
(discussing the points Franklindid not address).
121. 118 CONG. REC. 5802-15 (1972).
122. See 117 CONG. REc. 39,252 (1971) (statement of Rep. Mink) (explaining that because
women pay taxes into the Federal Treasury, Congress resents that these funds support institutions that discriminate).
123. 118 CONG. REC. 5,806-07 (1972).
124. Id. at 5804.
125. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (1996).
126. See ESFA: FrameworkFor Change: Hearingson S.1513 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources and the Subcomm. on Education, Arts, and Humanities, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1994)

(statement of Sen. Mikulski) (hereinafter ESFA Hearings] (quoting statistics from the AAUW
survey which illustrate that sexual harassment undermines a school's ability to provide a safe
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B. Determining Who Can Sue Under Title IX
To help accomplish Congress' goals, the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicagd recognized an implied private right of
action under Title IX for students and employees of federally funded
educational institutions who are discriminated against on the basis of
their sex. The Cannon Court used a four-part test from an early Title
IX case in order to determine whether a private right of action is to
be implied under a federal statute."" The four part test asks:
(1) is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted? (2) is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? (3) is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? and (4) is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? "
The Rowinsky majority did not discuss this case, but the dissent in
Rowinsky would have used this test, in conjunction with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Franklin, to grant the plaintiff a right of action.3 When interpreting Title IX, the majority in Davis noted that
"[t] here is no doubt that if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its
origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language."' 1
The Davis majority did not use the Cort factors to determine if a
cause of action existed. Instead, they relied on Sen. Bayh's statements, and used factors from the Menitor and Harrisdecisions.'
and equitable learning environment. Senator Mikulski emphasized the survey's findings that 23
percent offemales who were sexually harassed received lower grades on tests they took after the
harassment, as did 9 percent of boys who were sexually harassed, and that one-third of the girls
reported not going to school as a result of sexual harassment). See also Hearings on Reauthorization of H.R 6, The Elementary and Secondary EducationAct of 1965: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Elementay, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong.,

1st Sess., 429-31 (1993) (statement of Anne L. Bryant, president of AAUW) (explaining that
sexual harassment and discrimination, combined with many teachers' inadvertent yet common
favoritism of boys, causes low self-esteem. Bryant discussed a 1991 AAUW poll that documented
a relationship between a female's low self-esteem and her ability to excel in male-oriented fields,
such as mathematics and science).
127. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).

128. See Cortv. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (holding under this test that a woman who, because
of her sex, is denied admission to an education program that receives federal funds, has a cause
of action under Title IX).
129. Id. at 78.
130. SeeRowinsy, 80 F.3d 1006, 1017-20 (DennisJ., dissenting).
131. 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (holding that Title IX prohibited discrimination of employees as well as
students of federally funded educational institutions) (citations omitted)).

132. Dauis,74 F.3d at 1190, 1194. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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C. Definition of Sexual Harassment
This Casenote acknowledges that schools should not be liable for
every potentially bothersome sexual act or remark one student may
make to another.""5 However, situations such as those in Rowinsky
and Davis, where the harassment is prolonged and severe enough to
alter the conditions of one's education,"' should be covered in the
definition. Part of the problem of sexual harassment is that because
it is difficult to define, women and girls often don't know that the
behavior they are being subjected to is wrong, and often will not report it,' 5 thus perpetuating the problem. 5 Nevertheless, the current
definition of sexual harassment is as follows:
Sexual harassment consists of verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent
of a recipient that denies, limits, provides different, or conditions
services, or treatment protected unthe provision1 7of
s aid, benefits,
der Title X.

The EEOCl issued the following guidelines in 1980 for the Title
VII definition of workplace sexual harassment:
[u] nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ133. Examples of behavior that would not be covered include isolated or innocent behavior,
such as a boy holding his nose when a girl walks by, or standing in a girl's way. See Miller, supra
note 97, at 723. Miller argues that a universal definition of peer sexual harassment is essential
to protect victims of sexual harassment, as well as to protect schools from excessive liability. Id.
134. See Sherer, supranote 13, at 2161-62 (explaining that trivial and isolated incidents will
not present a Title IX claim if the severity and frequency of the abuse are examined in every
case). Sherer relies in part on EMison v. Brady,924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991), a Title VII case
must be pervasive or severe." Id. at 2161.
which held that "the harasser's conduct ...
135. See Dolan, supra note 15, at 225 n.100 (citing AAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 14)
(noting that victims of sexual harassment usually tell no one of the incidents, and if they do report it to anyone, it is to a friend. The AAUW survey found that only 7 percent of the sexually
harassed students reported the harassment to a teacher, and 23 percent turned to a parent).
136. The inability to define sexual harassment in clear terms may explain why women did
not report it until recently. See MACKINNON, supra note 119, at 27 ("It is not surprising that
women would not complain of an experience for which there has been no name. Until 1976,
lacking a termi to express it, sexual harassment was literally unspeakable, which made a generalized, shared, and social definition of it inaccessible.") (footnote omitted).
137. This is the definition adopted by the Office of Civil Rights. See Sherer, supranote 13, at
2126 & n.30.
138. See supra note 4.
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ment.1 39
While some states have their own definitions of peer sexual harassment, " ° critics of letting each state develop its own definition ar4
gue that this results in unclear and inconsistent guidelines,'
' and
42
states.
some
in
students
for
protection
less
in
result
may
1. The Importance of a ClearDefinition, andProposed Guidelines
It is important to have a consistent definition in order for a school
to know its potential liability. This Casenote emphasizes that a
school would not be responsible for every act of a sexual nature.
Rather, the schools would be liable only for abuse that is "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's [education]
and create an abusive [learning] environment.",4 1 Jill Suzanne Miller
argues that the definition enforced in Harris v. Forklift System, 144 a
Supreme Court Title VII case, in conjunction with EEOC guidelines,
is appropriate for the peer sexual harassment context.1 5
2. Defining a HostileEnvironment that is PervasiveEnough to Alter the
Conditions of One'sEducation
Miller explains the Harrisprinciple, which asks whether a reasonable person would find the questionable behavior objectively hostile.4 Harrisalso asks whether the victim subjectively finds the environment abusive enough to negatively alter her working
conditions. 47 In applying this definition, Miller argues that a school
administration would be liable "if they knew or should have known
that a reasonable student would have found their environment hostile, and if the student actually perceived that the peer harassment

139. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995). Part (b) then explains that the EEOC will examine the
"totality of the circumstances" when determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual

harassment. For further definitions of "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, as compared to
"hostile environment" sexual harassment, see supra note 2, and accompanying text.
140. See infraPartV.B, notes 306-11, and accompanying text.
141. See Miller, supra note 97, at 723 (explaining that a clear definition will prevent forcing

teachers to intervene in harmless situations that are a "natural part of social maturity").
142. See Miller, supra note 97, at 723 n.217 (proposing that a universal definition will allay
critics' fears that students will have sexual harassment claims for acts of innocent flirtation by

other students).
143. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
144. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
145. See Miller, supranote 97, at 722-23.
146. Miller, supra note 97, at 723 (citing Haris,510 U.S. at 17).
147. Miller, supra note 97, at 723.
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negatively affected his or her education."'4 Using EEOC guidelines,
Miller then asks whether the allegedly harassing conduct:
(i) has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment;
(ii) has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with a
student's education; or
(ii) otherwise adversely affects a student's educational opportunities.14
Although this Casenote advocates Miller's definition of hostile
education environment, this Casenote proposes that the school
would be required to have actual knowledge of the harassment, not
just constructive knowledge, in order to be found liable.
D. Relevant Title IX Case Law
Very few cases have directly addressed the issue of peer sexual harassment and Title IX liability. This is because Title IX specifically
requires schools to implement grievance procedures, 150 and therefore, many cases are settled and not litigated. 5' Because of this lack
of precedent, courts have looked to the standards of Title VII and Title VI.'* Of the cases that have addressed peer sexual harassment,
many that approved the application of Title VII standards never applied them because the cases were resolved on other grounds.

148. Miller, supra note 97, at 723.
149. Miller, supra note 97, at 724 (quoting Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color,
Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1609).
150. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (1995).
151. Miller, supra note 97, at 702-03. Miller also offers two other explanations for the scarcity of peer sexual harassment cases. One is the long term of one's employment compared to
the short term of one's education. A student may graduate from school before litigation is
completed, often making her claim moot. Id. at 703 (citing Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and HigherEducation, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 527 (1987)). But see Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1297-98 (N. D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the fact that the
plaintiff had graduated from high school did not render moot her claims for damages for hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title IX, but only rendered moot her claim for
prospective relief); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992) (allowing
damages in a teacher-to-student harassment case because equitable remedy of prospective relief
was inadequate given that the teacher no longer taught at that school, and the plaintiff was no
longer a student in that school system). Second, courts have traditionally deferred to the decisions of school administrators. Miler, supranote 97, at 703 (citing Schneider, supra, at 528).
152. Miller, supra note 97, at 703-704. Because this Casenote focuses on the analysis of the
Rowinshy court, it will not discuss Title VI.
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1. Guidance
from the Supreme Court in Franklinv. Gwinnett County Public
M
Schools
Christine Franklin brought a Title IX claim alleging she was sexually harassed by a teacher at her high school.5 4 The teacher, Andrew
Hill, harassed Ms. Franklin beginning in the fall of her sophomore
year (1986); she filed her complaint in December of 1988."'5 The
harassment included personal phone calls, forcibly kissing her on
the mouth in the school parking lot, engaging her in sexually oriented discussions on whether she would consider having sex with an
older man, and on three occasions, removing Christine from class by
requesting her teacher to excuse her, and taking her to a private office where he coerced her to have intercourse with him."" While
many other teachers and administrators knew of Hill's harassment of
Christine and of other female students, none took action, and they
even discouraged Franklin from pressing charges against Hill.'-7 Instead, the school allowed Hill to resign on the condition that all
charges against him be dropped.'M
Franklin is mainly a damages case. 59 The issue was whether the
implied right of action under Title IX which was recognized in Cannon v. University of Chicag o6° supported a claim for monetary damages.
Using older case law dealing with rights and remedies, the
Court held that Title IX authorizes an award of compensatory damages. 62 The Court implicitly found that the way the Gwinnett Public
Schools (and other schools) handled the problem, with a school
promise to fire (or force the resignation of) an accused harasser in
exchange for the victim's promise not to press charges, is not a sufficient remedy for a victim of sexual harassment. 63 The Court found
153. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
154. Id. at 63.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 64.

158. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 64 (1992).
159. SeeVirginia Davis Nordin, Terrence Leas & CharlesJ. Russo, Sexual Harassment and Stu-

dent Rights: The Supreme Court Expands Title IX Remedies, 75 EDuC. L. REP. 733, 741-42 (1992)
(explaining that the main holding of Franklin-that the plaintiff can not go without a remedywill apply to all federal cases, notjust to sexual harassment cases).
160. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
161. 503 U.S. at 62-63.
162. Id. at 66-71. The court cited to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946). Id. at66-67.
163. The Court explained that backpay under a Title VII analysis "does nothing" for Christine because she was a student when the discrimination occurred. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
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that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available under
Title IX, T' especially in light of two amendments to Title IX that

were enacted after Cannon't s which did not limit the remedies available. ats The Court held that Title IX "[u]nquestionably" placed a
duty on the Gwinnett School District to protect its students from in-

tentional sexual discrimination, including sexual harassment, by a
teacher, employee, or agent of the school, and authorized the awarding of damages in a Title IX claim.' 67
2. Early Title IX Cases that Looked to Title VUJfor Guidance
An early case that applied Title VII standards to a Title IX claim
was Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico.' s In Lipsett, the First Circuit applied Title VII standards to a mixed employment-educational context. The plaintiff was a medical student who was both a student and
an employee of the school, as were her harassers. 6 The court held
that it had "no difficulty extending the Title VII standard to discriminatory treatment by a supervisor" to a Title IX mixed employeestudent context case. ° Using the Title VII standard, the court held
that a school is liable for the hostile environment discrimination suffered by the plaintiff if "an official representing the institution knew,
unless that
or ... should have known, of the harassment's occurrence,
7
1
it."
halt
to
steps
took
she
or
he
that
show
official can
In PatriciaH. v. Berkeley Unified School District,'7 the court held that

Title IX mandates that institutions receiving federal financial assisAlso, because the person who subjected her to the discrimination (Hill) no longer taught at the
school, and Christine no longer attended the school either, "prospective relief accords her no
remedy at all." Id. The Court stated that the Government's response that administrative action
would help other students who are similarly situated (i.e., still in school), "acknowledges that
the Government's approach would leave petitioner remediless." Id.
164. Franklin,503 U.S. at 73.
165. Id. at 72-73. The Court noted that the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 abolished the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under Title IX, Tide VI, § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d7(a)(1) (1996). The Court further noted that Congress expanded the coverage of each of
these antidiscrimination laws with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259,
102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687-88, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 6107 & 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-4(a) (1994)).
166. Franklin,503 U.S. at 73.
167. Franklin,503 U.S. 60, 74-76 (1992) (suggesting in dicta that a school should not be held
liable for an unintentional violation, because presumably the school would have no notice of the
violation).
168. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
169. Id. at 897.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 901.

172. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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tance proscribe the maintenance of a sexually hostile education environment.' Ts Patricia H., a mother of two minor daughters, was romantically involved with a teacher at her daughter's high school. ' 74
The suit claimed that the teacher sexually abused the girls at home
and while on a family vacation.' 75 The mother alleged that while no
sexual abuse or harassment took place at the high school, the
teacher's presence there created a hostile education environment for
her daughters. 76 The court held that it could not say that mere
presence of the abuser, as a matter of law, did not create a hostile
education environment.1 77 The court also said, however, that it does
not mean that a hostile environment did exist, and the court left this
to the jury.'7 Following Titie VII case law guidelines,'7 as well as
OCR recommendations, "s0 the court said that the jury should use a
"reasonable student" standard which should take into consideration
"the age of the victim(s); the frequency, duration, repetition, location, severity, and scope of the acts of harassment; [and] the nature
of [sic] context of the incidents."''
Most importantly, by looking to Franklinand to Title VII standards
as Franklin and Lipsett did, the court found that the law permits
plaintiffs to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title IX.12 The PatriciaH. court felt that the work environment and the school setting are similar, and that "a student should
have the same protection in school that an employee has in the
workplace."'"

173. Id. at 1289, 1293.
174. Id. at 1294.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1296.
177. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1296-97 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)).
180. Id. at 1296 (citing OCR's Request forJudicial Notice).
181. Id.
182. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1291-93 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
183. Id. at 1292 (citing Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992)
("there is no meaningful distinction between the work environment and school environment
which would forbid such discrimination in the former context and tolerate it in the latter.
Women need not endure sexual harassment ... under any circumstances, the school setting included."), cert. denied sub nom. Caplinger v. Doe, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993)). After the Supreme
Court deciined to review the case, the Fifth Circuit granted a new hearing, Doe v. Taylor Indep.
Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Sherer, supra note 13, at 2155-57 (noting that
given the similarities between the workplace and the classroom, young students, because of
their reliance on school officials, have a greater need for protection from sexual harassment,
and explaining that the classroom is the precursor to the workplace); Gant, supra note 97, at
507-09 (noting the many similarities between the workplace and educational institutions).
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3. Cases thatAddress PeerSexual Harassment
The first federal case to directly address the issue of peer sexual
harassment was Doe v. PetalumaCity School District.!" In Doe, the plaintiff's classmates wrote lewd obscenities about her on bathroom walls,
and repeatedly referred to her as the "hot dog bitch," "slut," "hoe,"
and regularly asked her if she had a "hot dog" in her pants."" The
harassment lasted for two years and was severe enough that Doe's
mother had to withdraw her from the school. 86 During those two
years, however, Doe had complained to her high school counselor
repeatedly, but his only response was that "boys will be boys." 87 The
counselor never told Doe or her parents that the school had a Title
IX policy and representative. s Doe sued him individually under Title IX, and also sued the school. 8 9 The district court held that Tide
IX prohibits hostile environment sexual harassment,'o and denied
the counselor's claim of qualified immunity.19' The counselor appealed. 92 While the appellate court found that individuals had
qualified immunity and could not be sued under Title IX because a
school official's duty to prevent sexual harassment from peers was
not clearly established at the time of Doe's harassment, 3 the appellate court implied that it would have applied Title VII standards had
the harassment and the counselor's response occurred after the
Franklincase was decided. The PetalumaII court noted that Doe was
not required to prove that she had a right to be free from sexual
harassment from peers, because the issue was whether the counselor
184. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995),
reconsiderationgranted,949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Petaluma1]. Right before
the case came to trial, the school settled for $250,000. School District in CaliforniaSettles Sex Harassment Sui N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at A24.
185. Petaluma 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1565. Doe was also threatened for telling school officials
about the harassment, was degraded during lunch and class, and was on one occasion slapped
by another student. Id. at 1564-65.
186. Id. at 1565-66. Jane Doe's parents withdrew her immediately after a female student
approached her and wanted to fight; the altercation was prevented by the intervention of school
employees. Id. at 1565.
187. Id. at 1565.
188. Id. at 1564.
189. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Petaluma B].
190. Petaluma1, 830 F. Supp. at 1571. The court added that in order for a plaintiff "to obtain damages under Title IX (as opposed to declaratory or injunctive relief), [the plaintiff] must

allege and prove intentional discrimination on the basis of sex by an employee of the educational institution." Id. The district court rejected the application of Title VII's less rigid "knew
or should have known but failed to prevent" approach. Id.
191. Id. at 1578.
192. Petaluma I,54 F.3d at 1448.
193. Id. at 1450-51.
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had qualified immunity.4 Rather, Doe was required to prove that
she had a right to receive protection from peer sexual harassment
from an individual school counselor 5 The court noted a Fifth Circuit case'9 that said that a school principal and superintendent had a
duty to prevent teacher-to-minor sexual harassment, but that no
9 7
precedent established the duty to prevent peer sexual harassment.!
The court also accorded little weight to an opinion letter by OCR
which stated that the school
district had a duty to protect Doe from
9
peer sexual harassment.'
As for applying Title VII standards to impose school liability for
peer sexual harassment, the court was adamant that without a precedent to give the plaintiff a "clearly established right"'9 to protection
by a counselor from peer sexual harassment, the plaintiff could not
hold a school official individually liable.' ° The Franklindecision has
been cited for putting school districts on notice that the school district indeed could be held liable for damages for failing to prevent
teacher-student sexual harassment,"' but Franklin was decided in
1992. This was after the counselor mishandled Doe's complaints,
194. Id. at 1450, 1451 n.1.
195. Id. at 1451. The court said the issue was whether the counselor "had a duty to act to
prevent such harassment, not whether the harassment itself was permitted under Tite IX." Id.
at 1451 n.1. For the purposes of this Casenote, Title IX will apply only to school districts, not to
individual school officials.
196. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.), cat. denied, sub nom. Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815
(1994)). The Petalumacourt further distinguished Taylor from Petalumabecause Taylor involved
physical abuse, and gave rise to a substantive due process claim for the violation of the right to
bodily integrity. Petaluma11, 54 F.3d at 1451.
197. Petaluma , 54 F.3d at 1451-52.
198. Id. at 1452. The court stated that an OCR opinion letter does not dearly impose a duty

on the counselor to act to protect students from peer sexual harassment. Id.
199. Id. at 1451. The dissent in Petaluma argued that the majority's reading of prior case
law was too narrow, in that the majority looked for precedent that required a counselor to protect a plaintiff from peer harassment, while the majority ignored other case law that found a
right for plaintiffs to be free from sexual harassment in an educational environment. Id. at 1453
(Pregerson,J., dissenting). One case noted byJudge Pregerson was Pagano v. Massapequa Public School, 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a § 1983 claim lies for school officials'
failure to prevent continuing physical and verbal abuse by other students). Judge Pregerson
added that Title VII standards have been frequently imposed in Title IX cases that deal with
both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment cases. "'[B]ecause Title VII prohibits the identical conduct prohibited by Title IX,i.e., sex discrimination, ... [Title VII] is the
most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX substantive standards.'" Id. at 1454 (quoting
Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th
Cir.), cet. denied,484 U.S. 849 (1987) (alterations in original)).
200. Petaluma , 53 F.3d at 1451.
201. Id.at 1450. See also Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo.
1995) (citing Franklinto support the proposition that to seek money damages, the plaintiff must
show that the school district intentionally discriminated against her when it failed to act on
plaintiff's complaints of peer sexual harassment).
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and too late to put him on notice that he had a duty to protect the
plaintiff. The court said,
If [the counselor] engaged in the same conduct today, he might
not be entitled to qualified immunity... [Under the Franklin decision] ... [i]t might be that today a Title VII analogy likening [the
counselor] to an employer and Doe to an employee might provide
an argument to consider in a similar Title IX case. However, those
arguments are not properly before us. 202
While this statement is dicta, and the Rowinsky plaintiff did not rely
on it, the statement suggests that the PetalumaH-court would have
applied Title VII standards had the Franklinand perhaps the Davis
decisions, which provide the needed precedent, already been decided.
With this background, this Casenote now discusses the analysis in
Rowinsky.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROW!NSKYDECISION
The issue in Rowinsky was whether Title IX imposes liability on a
school district for peer-created hostile environment sexual harassment.2 3 A broader question presented was whether the recipient of
federal education funds can be held liable for sex discrimination
when the perpetrator is a party other than the grant recipient or its
agents. 201
A. The Language of Title IX
The court held that Title IX liability is limited to discrimination by
grant recipients, and does not apply to third parties because the
word "under" in Title IX means "by" and not "in," as Rowinsky argued. 2 5 The court focused on the plain language of the statute and
found that Title IX was drafted in a way that identifies a benefited
class in order to imply a private right of action.206 The court explained that the "open-ended language of Title IX" was not drafted
by Congress simply to prevent certain people from engaging in certain conduct, but that it was written to protect the rights of the bene202. PetalumaIi, 54 F.Sd at 1452.
203. Rowinsky v.Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996).
204. Id. at 1010. The court referred to grant recipients or its agents as "grant recipients."
Id. at 1011 n.10.
205. Id. at 1011. The relevant portion of Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, ... be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
206. Rowiunsky, 80 F.Sd at 1012.
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ficiaries. 207 The court then assumed arguendo that "under" means

"in," and went on to determine who is prohibited from discriminatory conduct under Title IX. To establish this, the court relied on
three factors: the scope and structure of Title IX, the legislative history, and agency interpretations.s
While the court found that "under" does not mean "in," legal
scholars have interpreted Title IX otherwise.2° Monica Sherer argues
that the statute does not make any distinction "between the level of
education of the victim nor between employee and student victims.
Therefore, any, elementary or secondary school student discriminated against because of sex should have a claim against his or her
school." 10 Using the language of Title IX,Sherer then contends that
victims of peer sexual harassment are both denied benefits and discriminated against in school, in accordance with the language of Title IX. 211 Peer sexual harassment, particularly when not taken seriously or not halted, affects a victim's ability to concentrate in
school.2 2 Sexual harassment may affect her ability to learn, her attendance, and the courses she decides to take.13 In addition, it may
cause her grades to suffer, thus affecting further educational goals,
such as career choice or college selection.
Sherer explains that
holding schools accountable for the conduct of students will serve
Title IX's purpose of helping to give women equal educational opportunities. This Casenote advocates Sherer's interpretation of Title
IX.
B. The Languageof the Regulations of the DepartmentofEducation
This Casenote submits that because of the limited case law involving peer sexual harassment, the Fifth Circuit should have considered the Department of Education regulations before settling on its
narrow interpretation of "discrimination." Sherer acknowledges that
207. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979)).
208. Id.
209. See Sherer, supra note 13, at 2152-54; Gant, supra note 97, at 511-13 (explaining that a
hostile environment caused by peer sexual harassment denies victims the benefits of an education program, while subjecting them to discrimination under that program. To support this
proposition, Gant cited the courts in Patrida H. and Petaluma1).
210. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2152-53.
211. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2153.
212. Dolan, supranote 15, at 225 n.104 (citing AAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 15-16).
213. Gant, supra note 97, at 513 n.211 (citing AAUW Survey, supra note 15, at 15-16, which
found that one in three girls who were sexually harassed did not want to go to school or speak
in class).
214. Gant, supra note 97, at 513. See supra notes 106-12, part I.C (discussing the effects of

peer sexual harassment).
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Congress gives little guidance in the text of Title IX regarding peer
sexual harassment. To supplement this lack of guidance, Sherer
proposes that courts consider the Department of Education's regulations.2 5 These federal regulations require that:
[I]n providing any aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipient
shall not, on the basis of sex:
(1) Treat one person differently from another in determining
whether such person satisfies any requirement or condition for the
provision of such aid, benefit, or service;
(2) Provide different aid, benefits, or services-or provide aid, benefits, or services in a different manner;
(3) Deny any person any such aid, benefit, or service;
(4) Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior,
sanctions, or other treatment.
This Casenote also draws attention to subpart (7) of the Department of Education regulations, which further prohibits grant recipients from:
[o]therwise limit[ing] any person in 7the enjoyment of any right,
privilege, advantage, or opportunity2
Sherer concludes that if a school investigates most student complaints, but fails to investigate complaints of peer sexual harassment,
the school has violated parts (1)-(4) of the Department of Education
regulations.21 8 Female students are denied services if a school punishes a claim of sexual harassment in a manner that is different from
how it handles or investigates other claims such as cheating, fighting,
or swearing. 9 If a school does not punish harassers, or punishes
them lightly, this demonstrates that the school treats the students
sanctions,"m0 thus violating section (4). As for secwith "different ...
tion (7), this Casenote proposes that if a school with knowledge
failed to adequately prevent the harassment from continuing, the
victim's opportunity to enjoy the privilege of her education has been
limited.2' In fact, knowing that the school will not protect her may
215. Sherer, supranote 13, at 2154.
216. Sherer, supranote 13, at 2154 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b) (1) (4) (1996)).
217. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b)(7) (1996).
218. Sherer, supranote 13, at 2154-55.
219. Sherer, supranote 13, at 2155.
220. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b) (4) (1995).
221. SewGant, supra note 97, at 513. Sexual harassment harms female students in two ways.
First, female students are denied the opportunity to receive an education equal to their male
counterparts. Second, it prevents female students from developing skills they need. Both of
these consequences violate the purposes of Title IX. Id. See 118 CONG. REC. S5808 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayh).
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further prevent the student from enjoying the benefits of her education.222
1. Proofof the School's DiscriminatoryIntent Should Not be Required

While the district court in Rouinsky was correct in examining the
school's response to the complaints, the Fifth Circuit erred by making this the sole examination?2 In addition, the court erred in requiring the plaintiff to prove that the school intended to discriminate on the basis of sex through its improper handling of the
complaint.22 4
The Petaluma court, on reconsideration, explicitly rejected the
Rowinsky court's reasoning.? By looking solely at whether the school
treated a female student's claims differently from a claim by a male,
the court may deny the female student a remedy altogether.226 This
is because girls are the victims of sexual harassment, whether by
peers or by others, more often than boys.227 If there are no male
complaints on file, a court has nothing to compare the school's
handling of the female's complaints, thus leaving her without a remedym which is precisely what the FranklinCourt wanted to prevent.'
This Casenote advocates the "intent" requirement as explained by
several district court cases:2 ° "intentional discrimination" on the
222. Accord Gant, supra note 97, at 508 (noting that young students have great reliance on
school officials to protect them). See infra note 250 (explaining that sexual harassment harms
young women to a greater extent than women in the workforce because of their immaturity and
reliance on teachers to protect them).
223. The dissent in Roinsky would have agreed with this, as it felt that the plaintiffs "stated
valid claims" under Title IX, and were entitled to proceed to trial. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep.
Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006. 1017 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
224. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016 ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on sex."). The Davis court, however, did
not require proof of an intent to discriminate because Title VII does not require such intent.
Rather, Davis employed the Title VII standard, and imposed liability on the school district if it
"knew or should have known" of the harassment and failed to take adequate remedial measures.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir.), vacated and reh gen banc
granted,91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
225. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Petaluma If] (order granting plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in light of developing case law
dealing with peer sexual harassment). The court applied Title VII's "knew or should have
known" of the harassment standard. Id. at 1423. If a school knew or should have known of the
harassment and then did nothing to prevent or remedy it, no further proof of the school's intent to discriminate is necessary. Id. at 1426.
226. Id. at 1420-21. The Petaluma XI court felt that the reasoning in Rowinsky "yields extreme results inconsistent with the body of discrimination law." Id.
227. See supranotes 101-04 and accompanying text.
228. Petalumal1, 949 F. Supp. at 1421.
229. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,76 (1992).
230. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding
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part of the school board should be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances. 2s The court should consider, in addition to a comparison of the school's handling of female and male complaints, evidence that the school had actual knowledge and failed to prevent
the harassment; that the school tolerated the harassment despite
numerous reports by the victim, her parents, other students, or the
victim's attorney; that the school failed to implement OCR and sexual harassment policies and grievance procedures; and the pervasiveness or seriousness of the harassment. 2 Other considerations
may include whether the school inquired into the victim's increasing
tardiness or absences from classes. 5 In Rowinsky, the BISD employed
a bus driver who disregarded school bus seating procedures, failed to
investigate the matter promptly (and ultimately did so only after repeated urgings by Mrs. Rowinsky), failed to accurately record the
complaint, and failed to inform the plaintiff of Title IX or any grievance procedures.2 4 The only punishment meted out against one
harasser was a three-day suspension from riding the bus (the other
harasser received no punishment).2
The victims, on the other
hand, endured a hostile environment that existed for an entire
school year.2m Had the Rowinsky court allowed intent to be inferred
by examining the relevant factors, it may have concluded that the
school's failure to take appropriate remedial action created and subthat a school's intent to discriminate may be inferred from its failure to remedy the harassment
despite actual knowledge); Petaluma , 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1575-76 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that
a school's failure to remedy a hostile environment is circumstantial evidence of the school's intent to discriminate); Bosleyv. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(inferring intent if the school knew of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action); Oona R.S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (inferring
intent if the school tolerated the harassment, failed to take adequate steps to deter or punish
the harassers, or encouraged the harassment).
231. Tide VII does not require the victim to prove her employer intended to discriminate,
even in cases of co-worker harassment. Rather, Title VII looks at the totality of the circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (1995). The Davis court applied Title VII standards and held
the school liable because it knew of the harassment and failed to take prompt and remedial action to end it. Davisdid not require intent. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186,
1195 (11th Cir.), vacatedand reh'gen banc granted,91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
232. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(taking these factors into consideration and finding that there was a genuine issue of material
fact of whether the school intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff in its handling of her
complaints because of the victim's sex). This Casenote does not require that the plaintiff prove
the school discrininated in its handling of her complaints on the basis of her sex. Rather, the
school must have knowingly tolerated a hostile environment by failing to take appropriate remedial measures.
233. Id.
234. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 117 S.
Ct. 165 (1996).
235. Id.
at 1009.
236. Id.
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jected the victims to a prolonged hostile environment.
C. The CourtDenied the Application of Title Vilfor the Wrong Reasons
The court hastily decided that "importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving
children is highly problematic. "s7 The court explained that there is
a power relationship among employers and employees, and also
among co-workers, and that an employer may be held responsible for
the actions of an employee through the theory of respondeat superior.2
The court then stated that in school, there is a power relationship between the institution and the student,2s but then mistakenly continued that "[iun the context of two students ... there is no
power relationship ... a key ingredient" to the harassment by a coworker analogy.2" This decision is misguided and unfortunate.2 11 If
the court believed that a power relationship was the missing ingredient that would have given Jane and Janet a cause of action, then the
court failed to examine it sufficiently, relegating it to a footnote. As
Sherer notes, and the Rowinsky decision demonstrates, adults tend to
overlook the difference in power among peers. 24 The power relationship exists in tiers of popularity, in identifying students who are
favored by a teacher or principal (perhaps imputing school liability
because school authority is involved), and social as well as academic
pressures to which students succumb.4
Sherer explains that students, in an effort to belong to a particular social group, may withstand uncomfortable behavior from a popular peer.2 "
237. Id. at 1011 n.11.
238. Id.
239. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1010 n.11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 165 (1996) (citing Ronna Greff Schneider, SexualHarassmentand HigherEducation,65 TEX.
L. REv. 525,533-36 (1987)).
240. Id. This assumption, that a power relationship is needed between co-workers to hold
an employer liable for the harassment between the co-workers, is incorrect. See infra notes 25253 and accompanying text.
241. It is possible that the Rowinsky court made this assertion because it mistakenly assumed
that accepting an agency/co-worker theory would automatically impose strict liability on school
districts for peer sexual harassment. See Recent Case. Sexual Harassment-TitleIX---ih Circuit
Holds School District Not Liable ForStudent-To-Student Sexual Harassment-Rowinsky v. Blyan School
Distric 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cat. denied, 65 U.S.LW. 3033 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 964), 110
HARv. L. REV. 787 (1997) [hereinafter Recent Case]. The Rowinsky court failed to recognize,
however, that no cases have suggested that strict liability will be the standard for third party acts,
Id. This Casenote does not advocate a strict liability standard.
242. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2131 n.58 (citing WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE, supra note
13, at 11).
243. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2131 n.59 (citing WHO'S HURT AND wHo's LIABLE, supra note
13, at 11).
244. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2131. Sherer also noted Gross, supra note 115, at A13, which
detailed that some girls who were targeted by the Spur Posse were "willing" to have sex with the
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The Rowinsky court further reasoned that Title VII is inappropriate
because " [u] nwanted sexual advances of fellow students do not carry
the same coercive effect or abuse of power as those made by a
teacher, employer, or co-worker."24' The court did not deny that the
victim was harmed by the harassment. Rather, the court stated that,
without the power relationship, the harasser had no coercive effect
on the victim. 2 6 The court incorrectly believed that a power relationship, which leads to a "coercive effect" on the victim, is necessary to
impute employer liability for co-worker's harassment of another coworker,247 and thus held that this coercive effect is necessary for sexual harassment to "exist" among peers.
Notwithstanding the contention that a power relationship does exist, a "coercive effect" exists as well. Congressional studies have revealed teacher favoritism towards boys.24 This favoritism, in conjunction with a victim's knowledge that the school will not protect her
from abuse, may have a coercive effect on the victim, such as forcing
her to leave the school. 249 Studies show that young girls and teenagers are more vulnerable to the effects of sex discrimination and harassment than adult women.an In addition, scholars and legislators
alike have expressed concern that failing to teach boys that harassment is wrong may turn them into workplace harassers in the future.2s Further, a coercive effect is not required by case law dealing
with workplace hostile environment sexual harassment by coboys because it would help make them popular. Sherer, supra note 13, at 2132 &n.68.
245. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n.11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 165 (1996).
246. Id.
247. The majority noted that the cases RoudnsAy cited to, which found employer liability for
the acts of third parties, were inapplicable because the power of the employer was implicated in
each case. Id.at 1011 n.11.
248. See supranote 126 and accompanying text.
249. The parents of the Petaluma plaintiff withdrew her from school because of the severity
of the harassment. Petaluma1, 54 F.3d at 1454.
250. See Baurac, supra note 57, at 1; Gant, supra note 97, at 508 (stating that a student victim's potential lack of maturity and greater reliance on school officials to protect her as compared to the maturity of a women harassed at work and her reliance on her employer, highlights the student victim's greater need for protection from school officials). See also Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that school children
are "too young to be considered capable of mature restraint"), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983);
D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks AreaVocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992)
(en banc) (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (noting that the law recognizes that children are incapable
of mature judgment), cert. denied,506 U.S. 1079 (1993).
251. See 139 CONG. REC. S11,931 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1993) (statement of Sen. Mikulski)
(stating that condoning abusive behavior with a "boys will be boys" brush off is unacceptable).
Cf Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Co-Workers Cited in Most Sexual Harassment Cases:Management Group's

Study Disputes Stereotype WASH. PoST,June 14, 1996, at DI (detailing a recent study which found
that 49.7 percent of sexual harassment claims were filed against co-workers, not superiors).
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workers. One of the leading Title VII cases, Henson v. City of Dundee,252 stated that "the capacity of any person to create a hostile environment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of
authority which the employer confers upon that individual."5 3 If a

coercive effect, and even a power relationship is not necessary in a
Title VII analysis, these elements are unnecessary in a Title IX analysis for peer sexual harassment as well.
1. The SimilaritiesBetween Work and School:
Scholars and courts alike have recognized the strong similarities
between the workplace and the learning environment.2
One
scholar, Elizabeth Gant, addresses their structural and functional
similarities.m She explains that in both situations, the victim is required to attend, complete her work, and meet deadlines and due
dates.2 5 The social atmospheres are also similar: each has breaks, a
lunch hour, socializing which may include flirting, school (or work)
sponsored
social events, and dealing with and answering to author25 7
ity.
Acts of sexual harassment in school tend to mirror those of the
workplace. In school, there is far more harassment and a greater
hostile environment created by peers than by teachers or employees.2 8 In work, co-workers are harassed and/or subjected to a hostile
work environment more often by co-workers than by a supervisor.2 9
In both situations, females are more often the victims, with males as

252. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
253. Id. at 910 (cited in Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1022 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (Dennis, J., dissenting)). Henson also stated that "[t]he environment in which an employee works can be rendered offensive in an equal degree by the acts
of supervisors, coworkers, or even strangers to the workplace." Id. Accord Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that women never know when a verbal sexual harassment will escalate into a violent physical sexual assault).
254. &ePetaluma11, 949 F. Supp. at 1425-26 (comparing the numbers ofwomen harassed in
the workplace to the comparably high numbers of females harassed in schools); Patricia H. v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. Cal., 1993) (noting that the few
differences between work and school only emphasize the need for greater protection of students from sexual discrimination); Davis, 74 F.3d at 1192 (declaring that public policy requires
that schoolchildren receive at least as much protection as workers).
255. Gant, supranote97, at 507-10.
256. Gant, supra note 97, at 507.
257. Gant, supra note 97, at 507-08. See also Sherer, supra note 13, at 2155-58 for a similar
comparison of school and work.
258. &e supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining the problem of peer sexual harassment).
259. Grimsley, supranote 251, at DI, D3 (revealing that nearly 50 percent of harassed workers are victimized by their co-workers).
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the harassers. 260 These simple yet important parallels further demonstrate that applying Title VII case law and principles in a school
setting is appropriate. The following sections will demonstrate that
the concerns of the Rowinsky court would be resolved by applying Title VII standards.
D. The Scope and Structureof Title IX
The court stated that Title IX was enacted under the Spending
Clause of the Constitution, indicating that Title IX prohibits discriminatory acts only by grant recipients. 26' The court contended
that while it is plausible that Tide IX could encompass ending discrimination by third parties, it is more probable that Title IX applies
only to grant recipients because the purpose of a spending condition
is to "induce the grant recipient to comply with the requirement in
order to get the needed funds." 62 If schools were liable for the acts
of third parties, over whom they lack control, the risk of failure
would be so high that no school would want the funding. 26 The
court concluded that this would in turn make the condition of Title
IX, federal funding in exchange for preventing sex discrimination,
almost useless.M
1. How a Title Vl Application Would Resolve the Rowinsky Majority's

Concerns
Had the court applied Title VII standards, the school would only
be liable for harassment that it had knowledge of, and also for harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of
the victim's education. 26' Thus, the notice requirement and the
260. Dolan, supra note 15, at 244 n.6 (citing a 1980 U.S. Merit Protection Service Board
Study which found that 42 percent of females and 15 percent of males were harassed on the
job). These percentages have remained constant over the past 15 years. The following numbers represent the Board's survey results for workers who experienced unwanted sexual attention in 1987: 42 percent of women and 14 percent of men; and in 1994: 44 percent of women
and 19 percent of men. Bill McAllister, SexuaI HarassmentRemains a Problem in Government, Study
Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1995, at A17. See Sherer, supranote 13, at 2128 (citing survey results
that show female students are more often harassed than male students).
261. There is some debate as to whether Title IX was enacted under the Spending Clause or
under the 14th Amendment. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1013 n.14
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996). This debate is of no consequence regarding damages. The Franklincourt held that a money damage remedy is available under Title IX, regardless of the source of its enactment. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75
(1992).
262. Roainsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. This comports with the Title VII requirement of a "hostile environment." See Ellison v.
must be perBrady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "the harasser's conduct ...
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qualifications for the seriousness of the abuse prevents the school
from being liable for the acts of "the multitude of third parties [over
whom they have little control] who could conceivably violate the
prohibitions of Title IX,"2 which is what the Rowinsky court was concerned with. This quote from the Rowinsky decision should be construed narrowly, if not considered dicta, because in Rowinsky (and
Davis as well), school officials did have or take control over the harassers. In Davis, the teacher had an opportunity to move the plaintiff's seat away from the harasser, and did not. 27 In Roudnsky, the
school monitored the students 'with video cameras, and therefore,
could see which students it had to reprimand, thereby solving the
problem before it escalated to the point where the plaintiff had to
file a lawsuit2's Also, in Rowinsky, the second bus driver assigned Jane
the seat next to her harasser. 269 Both of the Rowinsky instances (the
first, an action by a school official; the second, an inaction by a
school official) tolerated, if not increased, the hostility of the environment.2 0 Thus, the school boards did have "control" over the
situation in some respect, and would be held liable not for the conduct of its harasser-students, but for its own conduct of tolerating the
hostile and discriminatory environment.2 1 The Rowinsky reasoning
has been criticized for failing to recognize that a school board's
"inaction may constitute actionable discrimination."2
vasive or severe" enough to "create an abusive working environment."). Also, note that Title VII
imposes liability on an employer who had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment,
but that this Casenote advocates an actual knowledge requirement for schools to be held liable.
266. Rozoinshy, 80 F.3d at 1013.
267. Davis,74 F.3d 1186, 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
268. Rowdnsky, 80 F.3d at 1008. Had the school reviewed the tapes earlier, or on a regular
basis, or at least after the plaintiff's first complaint, the school also would have had notice.
269. Id. at 1008.
270. But cf. D.R. by L.RI v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (explaining that the school's inattention to male students' misbehavior neither created the danger in question nor made the victims more vulnerable to it),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993), dted in Dolan, supra note 15, at 229. Middle Bucks involved two
female vocational students who were in the same graphics art class as their male harassers. The
girls alleged that forced touching, fellatio, and masturbation of male students took place regularly over a five month period in a unisex bathroom and darkroom. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at
1366, 1378. Despite complaints to a school official, no action was taken. Id. at 1366. The court
in Middle Bucks, however, acknowledged that the line was "blurred" and that it was "not prepared to say that the conduct charged to the school ... crossed the line.." Id. at 1377.
271. SePetalumaLI, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
272. Id. (quoting Bator v. State of Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 1994)). Bator is a
Title VII case in which the court held that a supervisor who has been informed of the harassment and fails to stop it is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This Casenote will not
discuss Equal Protection Clause claims in the context of Title IX suits. See also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 88, at 12,036, 12,039-40 (explaining that Rouinsky misunderstood a
school's liability under Title IX, and that Title IX holds the school liable not for the actions of
its students, but for permitting the harassment to continue once it has knowledge of it). Accord
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Such factors (including the school's response to the complaints,
whether through its actions or inactions) would be taken into consideration in conjunction with the regulations of the Department of
Education. For instance, an inquiry into whether school officials in
Davis refused to move the seat of a male student who had been
beaten up by another boy would be helpful in determining if the
school treated all students the same, or if it increased the hostility of
the environment only in cases of sexual harassment (i.e., for the female student by denying her request for a new seating assignment).
This inquiry would further prevent the school from being liable for
every incident or for incidents which it did not have knowledge of,
since intent to discriminate would only be inferred if the school has
knowledge of the situation and failed to appropriately remedy the
situation. The majority's reasoning, that a school board's inaction
does not equal an intent to discriminate, should be construed narrowly to the situation where the school board or officials did not
have knowledge of the harassment.
This Casenote acknowledges that schools can not control the actions of every student, 74 even after punishment, as G.F.'s persistent
behavior demonstratesY 5 A Title VII application would address this
as well. Under Title VII, a supervisor is liable for the acts of coworkers that the employer knew or should have known about "unless
[the employer] can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action.2 7 6 In Rowinsky, the court should have inquired
into the promptness and appropriateness of the only punishment it
gave to one harasser.
The Rowinsky majority, in a footnote, makes an analogy that is not
entirely apposite.277 The court hypothesizes that the parents of a female student "discourage her from taking advantage of opportunities at school because they believe that a woman should not concentrate on an education,"278 thus denying her the full benefits of an
education. The court explains that if the school had knowledge of
Recent Case, supranote 241, at 790-91.
273. 34 C.F.R. 106.31 (b) (1996). &esupra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
274. Some scholars argue that just as employees have attendance requirements at work,
schools have control over students because of mandatory attendance laws in almost every state,
and even truancy laws that penalize students for unexcused absences. See Gant, supranote 97,
at 508-09; Dolan, supra note 15, at 234-38, 244 n.204 (discussing how the state exercises lawful

control over children's liberty for up to eight hours a day).
275. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008 (noting that G.F.'s three day suspension did not deter him
from harassingJane andJanet).
276. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995).
277. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013 n.15.
278. Id.
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the discrimination and failed to stop it, the school would be liable
under Title IX according to Mrs. Rowinsky's theory.2 " An absurd result, I agree. However, in this analogy, the girl is being discriminated
against by her parents, who are not under the control of the school.
Students have to be in the same school together because of attendance laws and students are subject to the behavior policies of the
school; the school has an equal amount of control or "power" over
male harassers as it does over female victims. 2ta In the court's hypothetical, the school has no control, however, over the behavior of the

parents, although it still has control over the female victim. Further,
schools are generally only liable for incidents that occur on school

grounds, during school hours."a Just as employers are only responsible for acts of their employees committed in the scope of their employmentY so should schools only be liable for the acts of students
committed while under compulsory school supervision.8
279. Id.
280. &eeDolan, supranote 15, at 234 (arguing that mandatory attendance laws, the immaturity of the student, and the broad discretion extended by the state to schools in controlling students create a special relationship between the school and the student. She also argues that the
student is in the functional custody of the state). Bta see Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732
(10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that compulsory attendance laws do not create a duty for the
school to protect students from the private acts of third parties), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 914
(1993); DorothyJ. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding
that the relationship between a school and a student is not "custodial").
281. Schools are usually not liable for incidents that occur during school functions such as
dances or graduation ceremonies where attendance is voluntary and optional. See Dolan, supra
note 15, at 230 (discussing Leffll v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994)). Leffall held that no special relationship existed between school and student when student was shot
to death after a high school dance because the student was in no way compelled to attend the
dance. Leffal2, 28 F.3d at 529. The court explained that "even though the student may have
been compelled to attend school during the day, any special relationship that may have existed
lapsed when compulsory attendance ended." Id. Dolan points out that the court did not say
that a special relationship never exists between a school and a student, but that it did not exist
"during a school-sponsored dance held outside of the time during which students are required
to attend school for non-voluntary activities." Dolan, supranote 15, at 231 (citing Leffall, 28 F.3d
at 529)).
282. In a negligence action, an employer is liable for harm caused by the negligent conduct
of his employee within the scope of the employee's employment. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF

AGENCY § 242 (1957). The dissent in Rowinsky would have applied agency law to hold a school
liable for the acts of its students. Roninsky, 80 F.3d at 1021 n.7 (Dennis, J., dissenting). This
Casenote does not advocate the agency approach because in cases of intentional sexual discrimination (where the school had notice) the issue is not one of negligence. For a brief discussion of what constitutes the scope of one's employment, as opposed to a "frolic and detour,"
which is not in the scope of one's employment, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON

TORTS, 454-57 (6th ed. 1995). Cf. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72-73 (1986)
(rejecting the argument that an employer is automatically liable for the wrongs of an employee,
whether or not it had notice of the wrongs, but also stating that lack of notice will not necessarily shield an employer from liability).
283. OCR, however, has stated that Title IX protects students in all aspects of "the academic,
educational, extra-curricular, athletic, and other programs of the school, whether they take
place in the facilities of the school, on a school bus, at a class or training program sponsored by
the school at another location, or elsewhere." Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 88, at
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The Rowinsky court also argues that Title IX's other provisions contain language that expressly mentions grant recipients in the exemptions."4 The court reasons that the emphasis on grant recipients in
other provisions "supports a conclusion that [Title IX] applies only
to the practices of the recipients themselves."' As argued earlier, a
school violates Title IX if it has a practice of knowingly allowing harassment to continue and thus subjecting the victim to
"discrimination under" its educational program. Additionally, the
text of Title IX makes no reference to whom is prohibited from discriminatory behavior; thus emphasizing the importance of the personal right conferred by Title IX, which is to be free from sex-based
discrimination in any educational program.2 86
E. Legislative History
The Rowinsky court criticizes Davis for its "selective use of legislative
history,, 287 despite its own narrow interpretation of Title IX's purposes. Rowinsky focuses on Bayh's purposes of preventing federal
money to be used for discriminatory purposes, and providing protection for victims of these discriminatory practices.2 The court reasons that because Sen. Bayh focused on eliminating discrimination
in "all facets of education-admissions, scholarship programs, faculty
hiring and promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales," 89 that
this list is exhaustive. The list, however, is not exhaustive; Title IX
ensures equal athletics opportunities as well,20 which does not appear in this quote.
The court is correct in acknowledging that even Sen. Bayh realized
that Title IX, while far-reaching, "is not a panacea" or cure-all for
every discriminatory practiceY. The court, however, limited Title
IX's intended applicability to those problems mentioned by Bayh,
such as "employment practices for faculty and administrators, ... access to programs within the institution such as vocational education
12,038.
284. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.
285. Id.
286. Cf Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1462-63 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
287. Rowinsy, 80 F.3d at 1010 n.8.
288. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704
(1979)).
289. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 5802, 5803 (1972)).
290. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1996). See Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)
(ordering Colgate University to grant women's ice hockey team, previously a club sport, varsity
status), vacatingas moot, 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
291. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 5808 (1972)).
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classes, and so forth." 2 However, Bayh wanted Title IX to be an
"important first step" to provide women with "an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, [and] to develop the skills they want
...
These intended areas of application were based on areas
where the problem of abuse had been reported to him.24 At this

time, there was little awareness of the problem of peer sexual harassment, or even sexual harassment, as this was before the EEOC
guidelines came out in 1980.2 s Even before the EEOC guidelines,
sexual harassment was held to be a violation of Title IX.2" One
could argue that since the problem of sexual harassment is now
more openly addressed, Sen. Bayh would not want federal money being spent on schools that allow female students to be subjected to
this form of discrimination. While Bayh did suggest that further legislation might be necessary, the legislation has yet to be developed.
Congress is aware of the gender inequality problems young girls face
in United States' educational programs, such as sexual harassment
and disfavor (both intentional and subconscious) of girls by teachers, and recent legislation has reflected this concern.27 However,
with all of the recent studies done on peer sexual harassment, Congress has not enacted a peer sexual harassment law, perhaps because
Title IX already exists and is the best defense to combat this growing
problem.2s

292. Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 5807 (1972)).
293. Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 5808 (1972)).
294. Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 5807 (1972)).
295. See Sherer, supranote 13, at 2168 n.149 (explaining that American society only recently
recognized the problem of sexual harassment, and as awareness of peer sexual harassment increases, claims under Title IX may increase as well); MACKINNON, supra note 119, at 27.
296. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that a plaintiff
who alleges sexual harassment "is within the class Title IX was designed to protect"), affd on
otherground4 631 F.2d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 1980) (agreeing with the district court that a justiciable
claim for relief under Title IX was presented).
297. See EEA Hearings supra note 126, at 632 (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (noting the
AAUW Survey results and stating that peer sexual harassment is one of many problems of inequity in education, and that improvement money should be given to schools and states working
to develop sexual harassment policies). Also, because boys often feel flattered, and enjoy sexual
comments made about them, they do not suffer the same negative impact as a result of peer
sexual harassment as girls do. See Sherer, supra note 13, at 2132; Jennings and Howell, supra
note 15, at C3; Marjorie Williams, From Women, An Outpouring of Anger, Rhetoric UnderscoresDeep
Divisions in How the Sexes View Harassment, WASH. Posr, Oct. 9, 1991, at Al (noting that while

harassment results in great intimidation for females, males largely escape this impact).
298. As the two amendments to Title IX demonstrate, Congress has sought to expand the
coverage of Title IX, not to limit it. See supranote 165 and accompanying text. Also, when writing legislation such as ESEA, Congress uses Title IX as its point of reference, in reliance that
Title IX will provide schools with enough guidance to formulate their own policies. See 139
CONG. REC. S11,916-03, S11,932, 511,933 (daily ed., Sept. 15, 1993) (statements of Sen. Kennedy and-Sen. Mosley-Brown).
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V. AVENUES OF RELIEF FORVICTIMS OF PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

A brief explanation of other claims and remedies available to victims of peer sexual harassment, as well as current Title IX procedures, is helpful in demonstrating their minimal impact and effectiveness, and in supporting the expansion of protection under Title
IX.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Victims of peer sexual harassment often also claim that the school
violated her or his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 by tolerating
the harassment or by failing to prevent it. In a § 1983 claim, the victim sues a school official or employee in her or his official capacity in
order to obtain damages. However, these claims have many disadvantages for the victim. First, the cost of a § 1983 claim is borne by
the plaintiff, while a Title IX claim is brought by the governmentun
Second, the plaintiff in a § 1983 case must meet a higher standard of
proof. The plaintiff must prove that she had a "clearly established
right" to be free from peer sexual harassment, and must further
prove that a state actor (a school official or employee) deprived her
of this right.s0' Even if she does prove this, school officials often invoke a successful defense of qualified immunity,0 2 claiming that a
reasonable person in their position would not have felt that his or
her actions (or in many cases, inactions by failing to prevent more
harassment) were violating the plaintiff's civil rights,""3 or that no
special relationship existed to require the school official to protect
the student.'04 Most § 1983 claims are unsuccessful because of this
299. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ... causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
300. In a Tide IX claim, OCR initiates and investigates an alleged Title IX violation, thus
saving the victim the cost of paying an attorney if she files only a § 1983 claim. See infraPart V.C.
301. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1367 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
302. See PetalumaII, 54 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 (allowing counselor's qualified immunity defense
because harassment of student by peers occurred before Franklinwas decided, and thus, there
was notice to the counselor that he was obligated to protect the student from harassment).
303. Id. at 1450 ("'[t] he contours of the [clearly established] right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'") (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
304. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(holding that the state owed no constitutional duty to protect a child from his abusive father);
DorothyJ. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a school had no
duty to protect a mentally retarded high school student from sexual attack while at school);
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372 (holding that students are not in custody of the school, and
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higher burden of proof.'a'
B. State Remedies

Only five states have legislation that requires schools to implement
and distribute sexual harassment policies that apply to harassment by

peers.3 6 Of the few states that do, only two-California and Florida-require that the policy also include a punishment of expulsion
or suspension for harassers.m Even though the number of states
with laws that require their schools to address the problem of peer

sexual harassment is small, it is an improvement from 1993, when
only two states-Minnesota and California-required their schools to
have such policies.5 t 8 This increase may be due to an increased
awareness of the problem. 9
Unfortunately, most cases of peer sexual harassment are never

fully litigated because they have little prosecutorial merit for the victim, or because they are settled out of court, thus having little impact

on or precedence over later peer sexual harassment claims '°
Allowing Title IX to impose liability on schools for failing to stop
known peer sexual harassment will give states an incentive to develop
and enforce peer sexual harassment policies to protect themselves
from a loss of funding and/or a payment of damages to the victims
under Title IX.s'
therefore, the school has no duty to protect students from peer sexual harassment).
305. For a more detailed explanation of the disadvantages of § 1983 daims, see Gant, supra
note 97, at 491-94; Sherer, supra note 13, at 2143 & n.130.
306. MINN. STAT. § 127.46 (West 1994) (mandating that school boards adopt harassment
policies that apply to both employees and students); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.2 (West 1995)
(stating that a pupil may be suspended or expelled for committing sexual harassment as defined
in CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.5); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.23 (West 1996) (requiring schools to give
notice to pupils that a pupil's violation of the school's sexual harassment policy is grounds for
specified punishment); MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 380.1300A (West 1987 & Supp. 1996)
(requiring that schools adopt sexual harassment policies that apply to employees and students);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.640.020 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996) (requiring schools to adopt
harassment policies that apply to employees as well as peers).
307. California requires that harassers in grades four through ten be either suspended or
expelled. CAL. EDuc. CODE. § 48900.2 (West 1995). Florida mandates in or out of school suspension, expulsion, other disciplinary actions, and/or criminal penalties. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
230.23 (West 1996). Michigan's statute says that the policy must, at a minimum, proscribe the
penalties for violating the sexual harassment policy, but does not mandate what those penalties
should be. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1300a (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
308. Minnesota was the first state to pass such a policy in 1992, followed by California in
1993. See Sherer supranote 13, at 2139-42; Gant, supranote 97, at 515.
309. See Gant, supranote 97, at 515 & n.227 (noting that other states have begun to discuss
implementing sexual harassment policies in their schools).
310. See Sherer, supra note 13, at 2141-42. See supra note 184 (discussing the settlement of
the Petalumacase in California).
311. See Dolan, supra note 15, at 243-44; Gant, supra note 15, at 506, 515-16. See also Ellen
Vargyas, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools and its Impact on Title IX Enforcement 19 J.C. &
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C. OCR Procedures
Any person with a concern regarding sexual harassment or discrimination in school may file a complaint with the OCR Representative at the school.3 12 The concern may be one of actual sexual harassment, or a complaint that the school has violated procedural
requirements of Title IX regulations."' 3

A person may also file a

complaint on behalf of a student or students who allegedly have
been sexually harassed.1 4
OCR then investigates and reviews the complaint to determine if
Tide IX has been violated.1 5 If no violation is found, the case is
closed.16 If a violation is found, OCR will enter into negotiations
with the school to demand compliance with Tide IX.

17

If this fails,

OCR will begin administrative proceedings to stop the harassment."8
If the administrative review board finds that the school has violated
Tide IX, all federal funding will be cut.319
1. The Shortfalls of OCR Proceduresand Remedies
Prior to Franklin, which authorized damages to the victim, the
complainant had no specific remedy under Tide IX.32 ' Further, OCR
has, perhaps wisely, never exercised its power to cut off funding from
any school.3 2' Critics argue that terminating funds only hurts the
students and the quality of their education, does not compensate the
victim, and will not deter peer sexual harassmentss Because of the
limited relief in OCR procedures and other avenues, courts should
construe Tide IX to allow a victim of peer sexual harassment a cause
U.L. 373, 381 (1992) (explaining that prior to Franklin, because Title IX provided little remedy
to the actual plaintiff and was rarely enforced, schools had little incentive to address sex-based
discrimination).
312. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1996).
313. 34 C.F.P § 100.7(b)-(c) (1996).
314. Id.

315. 34. C.F.R. § 100.7(d) (1) (1996).
316. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d) (2) (1996).
317. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1) (1996). The "informal means" of negotiations may include
visits, phone calls, and letters to the school.
318. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1996).
319. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)-(c) (1996).
320. See Vargyas, supra note 311, at 381. See also Alexandra A. Bodnar, Arming Students For
Battle:Amending Title IX to Combat the Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Pyimaiy and Secondaty Schoo4 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WofEN'S STUD. 549 (1996) (arguing that Title IX should be

amended to expressly prohibit school toleration of peer sexual harassment).
321. SeeVargyas, supranote311, at381.
322. See Sherer, supra note 13, at 2150-51 (citing Pamela W. Kernie, Comment, ProtectingIndividuals From Sex Discrimination:Compensatoy Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972,671WASH. L. REv. 155, 166 (1992)).
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of action, and grant damages if necessary to give the plaintiff an appropriate remedy, as required by Franklin.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A Proposed Test to Determineif a PlaintiffHas a Cause ofAction in Peer
Sexual Harassment Claims
When determining if a plaintiff has a cause of action under Title
IX, this Casenote advocates a modified Davis approach. 2s To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, the plaintiff must allege
and prove all of the five elements. The test this Casenote recommends is: (1) Is the plaintiff a member of a protected group?; (2)
Was she subject to unwelcome sexual harassment?; (3) Was the harassment based on her sex?; (4) Was the harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her education
and create an abusive educational environment?; and (5) Did the
school have actual knowledge of the harassment and fail to take
prompt and appropriate remedial measures? Only the fifth element
differs from Davis. 2 4 While Davis allows a cause of action where the
school knew or should have know of the harassment and failed to
stop it,s 2 this Casenote advocates a cause of action (and school liability) if the school had actual (not just constructive) knowledge of the
harassment and failed to take prompt and remedial action. If a
school has notice of the harassment and fails to take prompt remedial measures, the school has violated Title IX because it allows a
student to be subject to sex-based discrimination under its educational program. The violation
6 intentional because the school had
32 is
harassment.
the
of
knowledge
323. The test used by Davis is the test that is commonly used in Title VII cases. See supra
note 11 and accompanying text See Mertor,477 U.S. at 66-73; Harris,510 U.S. 17, 20-23 (1993);
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. See also Sherer, supra note 13, at 2158-67 (proposing a similar test
and explaining each element).
324. Davis required that "some basis for institutional liability" be established by the plaintiff.
Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194.
325. The Davis court relied on its own holding in Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905
(l1th Cir. 1982), and held a school liable if school officials "'knew or should have known of the
harassment ... and failed to take prompt remedial action.'" Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195 (quoting
Henson, 682 F.2d at 905).
326. Cf Franklin,503 U.S. at 74-75 ("The point of not permitting monetary damages for an
unintentional violation is that the [institution receiving federal funding] lacks notice that it will
be liable for a monetary award. This notice problem does not arise in a case ... in which intentional discrimination is alleged.") (citations omitted).
There is the possibility that requiring actual knowledge may encourage schools to ignore the problem so they can argue that they should not be held liable because they did not
have knowledge of the harassment. There are two ways of handling this. First, if a court can
determine that a school deliberately remained ignorant of the harassment (or had actual
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2. Applying the Test to the Facts in Rowinsky
First, as females, Jane andJanet are members of the group Title IX
was designed to protect. Second, they were subject to unwelcome
harassment as they repeatedly complained to school officials and
their parents about the harassment. Third, the harassment was
based on their sex and was sexual in nature since it involved groping
of the genitalia, breasts, buttocks, and sexual propositions. These
actions constitute "verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature." 27
Fourth, to determine whether hostile environment existed, courts
should look to Title VII hostile environment standards. A hostile
environment is one that is "permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."'3 8 This inquiry would examine (1) the
frequency of the incident; (2) the seriousness of the incident;32 (3)
whether the harassment is "physically threatening or humiliating
rather than merely offensive";20 and (4) "whether it unreasonably interferes with the plaintiffs performance" and/or ability to learn.
These factors must be viewed both subjectively3 2 and objectively.3
knowledge of it and denied it), the court should view this as an intentional violation of Title IX
by subjecting a student to discrimination under their educational program. Second, if a school
fails to provide adequate channels through which it can obtain notice of the harassment, the
court may inquire as to whether the adequate notice channels were intentionally not created to
maintain ignorance. Not having adequate grievance procedures to deliberately avoid Title IX
liability could be viewed as an intentional violation of Title IX, particularly if the school does
have grievance procedures for other types of student complaints. (This is an example of the
rare situation where the Rowinsky reasoning may actually be useful to victims of sexual harassment). Examples of adequate channels could be as simple as informing students that, if they
are harassed, they should report it to a school employee, or perhaps the OCR representative.
327. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
328. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Met/tor,477 U.S. at 65).
329. Less serious incidents may become pervasive if they occur frequently, while very serious
incidents need only happen once to create a hostile environment for the victim.
330. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194. See also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 88, at 12,04142 (suggesting that the ages and sex of the harasser and the victim, the number of victims involved, along with any other incidents of discrimination at the school, whether sex-based or not,
should be considered in addition to the factors listed in Davis).
331. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 88, at 12,041
(explaining that in addition to tangible effects, such as falling grades and class absences, a hostile environment may exist even though a victim of sexual harassment still attends classes and
maintains her grades, despite being angered and humiliated by the harassment). Similarly, Tide VII recognizes that the effects of sexual harassment are not always tangible or obvious, but
can also be emotional or psychological, and can result from a hostile environment. See Mentor,
477 U.S. at 64.
332. If a plaintiff does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive or hostile,
then the conduct has not altered the conditions of her environment. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194
(quoting Harnis,510 U.S. at 22).
333. Title VII requires that a reasonable woman would find the conduct severe and pervasive
enough to create a hostile or abusive environment. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991). EM/ion recognized that women are more sensitive and vulnerable to the threat of sexual
harassment, while men are unaware of the threat that women perceive. Id. at 879. Since females are impacted more harshly than males in cases of peer sexual harassment as well, a similar
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In Jane andJanet's case, a hostile environment existed because (1)

the harassment occurred on a regular (almost daily) basis for approximately eight months. It involved physical assaults, groping of
their genitals, and subjection to obscene and vulgar language directed towards them by more than one harasser; (2) the conduct,
such as physical groping and unwelcome requests for sex, was physically threatening and humiliating; (3) a reasonable woman would
have been offended by this conduct; (4) Jane and Janet were reasonably offended by the conduct and the fact that they repeatedly
reported the conduct in an effort to end it, to no avail, demonstrates
that a hostile environment existed.
Fifth, the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, as evidenced by the girls' complaints to the school bus driver, and the
parents' visits and telephone calls with numerous school officials at
various levels, as well as the assistant principal's3 own admission that
he learned of the assault from another student. 3
A school would be liable if it knew of the harassment and failed to
take appropriate measures to remedy the harassment. The school
should take "prompt and adequate remedial action." 3 5 Examples of
proper action for first time offenders could include a parent conference with the harasser, or an apology to the victim. 3 6 This allows the
harasser to realize his behavior is wrong, and will help prevent such
conduct in the future, rather than a simple punishment with no explanation, which may be less likely to deter the harasser. 337 Continued offenses may merit suspension or expulsion as punishment!S
While the school in Rowinsky punished two of the harassers with
three-day suspensions, it was not prompt in its punishments and, in
fact, administered punishments only after Mrs. Rowinsky repeatedly
demanded action.3 9 The school was slow and inaccurate in investigating the incidents, and when it finally replaced the first bus driver,
the new driver did not enforce the seating restrictions. ° Although
one of the harassers stopped harassing the girls right after his suspension, the other continued to harass Jane and Janet for four

reasonable woman test should apply to Title IX cases as well. See also Sherer, supra note 13, at
2162-64 (explaining other standards that are sometimes used, such as reasonable victim).
334. Roudnsky, 80 F.3d at 1008-09.
335. Katzv. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983).
336. &e Sherer, supra note 13, at 2166.
337. Accord Sherer, supra note 13, at 2166-67.
338. Sherer, supranote 13, at 2166.
339. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008-09.
340. Id.
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months after his suspension.

'
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His reasons for finally ending the

harassment are not specified in the case, but he certainly was not encouraged to end the harassment by the school's meager discipline.3
To the credit of the school, it promptly punished the third harasser,
who was accused of reaching under Janet's shirt and unfastening her
bra, with a day and a half suspension.m The school, however, never
informed the plaintiff about the existence of Title IX.s Here, the
court could have concluded that the school failed to respond
promptly and effectively, and this failure constituted an intentional
violation of Title IX. This Casenote submits that given the lack of a
prompt and appropriate remedy despite knowledge of the harassment, the court should have recognized that the plaintiff had a valid
cause of action.

VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of peer sexual harassment is real and growing, as
evidenced by the increasing number of Title IX claims.4

It is time

for a clear, workable guideline to help prevent courts and schools
from trivializing incidents of peer sexual harassment, and to help
schools identify and address the problem. The well-established caselaw of Title VII provides the basis for these guidelines. OCR has
taken the first step in providing guidance to the courts by recently
developing guidelines after submitting initial proposals to schools
for review.m'
As this Casenote has demonstrated, without a Title IX cause of action, a plaintiffs remedies are limited. Relief on the state, federal,
and administrative level is insufficient; and institutional remedies are
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1009.
343. Id.
344. Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996).
345. Under this test, if the court finds that a school did take prompt and appropriate remedial action, the school would not be liable.
346. See Rone Sherman, SchoolDistrictsSued on SexualHarassmentBy Fellow Students, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 13, 1993, at 10 (explaining that awareness of peer sexual harassment as a problem has led
to an increase in complaints filed with the Department ofJustice. In 1988, the Department of
Justice received 27 student complaints of sexual harassment, either by school employees or by
students. In 1993, the Department ofJustice received 156 such complaints).
347. In compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 3412 (1994), on August 16, 1996, OCR sent initial proposals to schools. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Peer Sexual Harassment, 61 Fed. Reg.
42,728 (1995). The proposal was initiated because of an increased inquiry of the extent of a
school's liability under Title IX, as well as the Rowinsky court's rejection of "the authority of
other Federal courts and OCR's longstanding construction of Title IX." See Sexual Harassment
Guidance, supranote 88, at 12,034-35, 12,039 n.27.
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not adequate under Franklin. A cause of action under Title IX will
provide plaintiffs with a much-needed remedy and the potential to
obtain damages.
In addition to providing a remedy for plaintiffs, imposing Title IX
liability gives schools an incentive to implement their own policies
and programs on peer sexual harassment, thereby helping to eliminate the problem through prevention, and by promoting a discrimination-free and abuse-free education with equal opportunities for
male and female students.

